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ABSTRACT 
This thesis builds upon existing contemporary theories that attempt to explain the 
outcomes of asymmetric conflict.  Specifically, this thesis uses Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s 
Strategic Interaction Theory as a baseline to identify theoretical gaps that can not only 
help further explain asymmetric conflict outcomes, but also provide insight into 
developing the proper strategy for strong actors.  Arreguín-Toft contends that when the 
strong actor employs the correct strategy then it will win over 75 percent of conflicts 
against a materially weaker adversary.  This leads to a fundamental question: if the strong 
actor uses the correct strategy against a weaker opponent, then why do strong actors still 
lose nearly 25 percent of the time?  In an effort to identify other key variables that help 
explain non-conventional war outcomes, this thesis evaluates case studies where the 
strong actor both won and lost an asymmetric conflict after choosing the correct strategy.  
This study finds two other factors that are important to achieving victory in an 
asymmetric conflict.  First, the strong actor must have a viable indigenous political 
authority to work by, with and through.  This concept has little to do with political 
legitimacy.  Instead, it focuses on the capacity of the host nation, with strong actor 
assistance, to synchronize its military and political effort to defeat the insurgency.   
Second, the strong actor must not only use restraint in applying direct military power, but 
it must also use the correct force: a cadre that is trained in conducting irregular warfare.  
As such, this thesis’ conclusions are aligned with the belief that it is the host nation’s war 
to win or lose—adhering to this principle provides the strong actor with the best chance 
of “defeating David” before losing its political will. 
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There is also a natural and very, very strong empathy with the underdog, 
with people who have suffered, people who have been pushed around by 
foreigners in particular, but also by their own people. 
—Lakdhar Brahimi 
Stories about underdogs like Jackie Robinson, the first black player in Major 
League Baseball, make us feel good, remind us that anything is possible, and inspire us to 
stand-up for what is right in the face of adversity.  Who did not cheer for Rudy Ruettiger, 
the 165-pound local walk-on to make the Notre Dame Football team, and who can forget 
the “miracle on ice” in 1980 when the U.S. amateur hockey team defeated the Soviet 
Union en route to winning the Olympic Gold Medal?  There are countless stories, both 
fiction and factual, where against all conceivable odds a hero, heroine, or group of 
dedicated individuals beats a significantly stronger opponent in the arena, on the court, or 
on the battlefield.  Indeed, as he slung his rock at the enormous soldier named Goliath, 
David became the greatest underdog in the history of the world.  In fact, the American 
affinity for an underdog story is rooted in its very existence.  In the late 18th century, a 
compilation of state militias banded together to defeat a superior British Army to win 
their independence.  However, the propensity to cheer for an underdog is not uniquely 
American.  Throughout history, smaller and weaker powers have found ways to defeat a 
superior adversary despite seemingly insurmountable odds.   
Typically, these stories tell of a great leader, sportsman, or warrior that led the 
weaker force to victory; however, in the reality of warfare, sometimes the weaker actor is 
not necessarily a “good guy.”  Indeed, when thinking just about the post-War Two era, 
“underdog” victories include a litany of what can be described as criminal regimes such 
as Fidel Castro’s Cuba and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan shortly after Soviet 
withdrawal.   
Regrettably, the other side of these coins often shows a superior force with a more 
egalitarian political philosophy that made key mistakes enabling the weaker side to win.  
This paper attempts to identify those key mistakes.   
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A. IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS  
The military lethality and force projection capacity of the United States is 
unrivalled in the 21st century.  Yet, a decade into the longest war in its history in 
Afghanistan; the United States, arguably the strongest power in both relative and real 
terms, is nowhere near a solution.  In fact, the U.S. military efforts in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan are illustrative of a growing vulnerability of strong actors fighting non-
conventional wars.1  Simply stated, strong powers have been increasingly losing 
asymmetric conflicts over time.  Figure 1 demonstrates this trend. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Percentage of Conflict Victories by Type of Actor  
(From Arreguín-Toft, 2005) 2 
However, this same weakness is not visible in direct or conventional conflicts 
where the strong actor benefits from a military material and force advantage.3  There are 
several insightful theories that attempt to explain why the weak can defeat the strong in 
an asymmetric conflict.  These theories range from interest asymmetry among the 
principal actors, to regime type, to strategic interaction, and finally to external support for 
the weak actor.  No one theory by itself answers the question(s) about why strong powers 
lose or how weak powers win.  However, even collectively, these theories fall short of 
                                                 
1 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
2 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 4. 
3 Ibid. 
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fully explaining the complex nature of asymmetric conflict and the implications for 
strong powers who find themselves increasingly pitted against a weaker opponent.  What 
is apparent is that small actors appear to have identified this weakness and are exploiting 
it to their advantage.  Given the United States’ efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq this past 
decade, combined with the fact that insurgency has been the most prevalent form of 
conflict since 1949,4 few would argue against the prediction that the United States will 
continue to be engaged in small, asymmetric wars against militarily inferior adversaries 
for the foreseeable future.  More importantly, one could perceive that because the United 
States has such an overwhelming military that it did not plan for, or was not prepared for, 
the strategy of its adversary.  
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this paper then is to take a closer look at the major arguments 
regarding asymmetric conflict outcomes and attempt to evaluate why strong actors 
increasingly lose to weak actors.  The goal is to identify any critical variables beyond the 
dominant contemporary theories that can enable strong powers to make sound decisions 
to defeat their weaker opponents.  To be clear, the term asymmetric conflict refers to an 
asymmetry of relative levels of power between conflict actors, which is commonly 
related to an actor’s military and economic capacity.  As such the strong actor has a 
significant material advantage in both military and economic resources when compared 
to weak actor.  In theory, relative power equals real power, or the capacity to produce an 
intended effect.5  However, it is evident that relative power does not always equal real 
power; and more importantly, real power does not always equal victory in an irregular 
war.  Additionally, this paper specifically considers weak v. strong actors engaged in 
irregular warfare (as defined by the U.S. Department of Defense Joint Publication 1–02 
Dictionary of Military Terms).  Because terms are often conflated, it is important to 
distinguish the term Irregular Warfare (IW) from two of its sub-components:  
                                                 
4 Thomas X. Hammes, “Why Fight Small Wars?” Small Wars Journal 1 (April 2005): 1-5, accessed 
October 15, 2011,    http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjvol1.pdf . 
5 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1959), 205. 
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Unconventional Warfare (UW) and Counterinsurgency (COIN).  These terms are defined 
below.  Additionally, Figure 2 helps illustrate the relationship between IW, UW, and 
COIN.   
 
Figure 2.   Authors’ Depiction of Irregular Warfare 
Irregular Warfare:  A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 
legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors 
indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of 
military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, 
and will.  Moreover, the following five activities exist under the heading of 
Irregular Warfare: Unconventional Warfare, Counterinsurgency, Foreign Internal 
Defense, Counter-Terrorism, and Stability Operations.6 
 
Unconventional Warfare: Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement 
or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power 
by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a 
denied area.7 
 
Counterinsurgency:  Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat 
an insurgency and to address any core grievances.8 
 
Therefore, the primary difference between UW and COIN, under the overarching 
heading of IW, is perspective.  When conducting UW, the actor (strong or weak) is 
attempting to overthrow an existing state power or occupying power.  Put simply, UW 
                                                 
6 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Ft. 
Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2011), 180, accessed November 10, 2011, 
https://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA485800. 
7 Ibid., 357. 
8 Ibid., 82. 
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equals insurgency.  Whereas, the term COIN specifically refers to a state or occupying 
power applying resources to quell an insurgency.  In this reference, the insurgent force is 
always the weak actor; however, the insurgency may be supported by a strong actor 
through a form of UW. 
Two other terms that are associated and often misused when defining asymmetric 
conflicts between strong and weak actors are Guerrilla Warfare and Insurgency.  
Guerrilla Warfare (GW): Military and paramilitary operations conducted in 
enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. 9  
Not synonymous with unconventional warfare. 
 
Insurgency: The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or 
movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.  
Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.10 
 
This thesis will use the definitions outlined above to describe the nature of the 
small actor.  Thus, in all cases, the small actor is an insurgent force that is employing a 
guerrilla warfare strategy to defeat an existing state power or occupying force.  In any 
conflict, conventional or non-conventional, the focus of both military and political 
strategies should be on the adversary’s center of gravity.11  In an asymmetric conflict 
environment, this paper adheres to the approach that the population is the center of 
gravity. 
C. THESIS PLAN 
The game plan for the remainder of this paper is to briefly summarize the 
dominant contemporary theories that attempt to explain asymmetric conflict outcomes.  
Through review and analysis several potential theoretical gaps and/or weaknesses were 
identified that were then used to develop thesis research questions.  The research 
questions, which are listed after the literature review, were then applied to case study 
                                                 
9 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,150. 
10 Ibid., 170. 
11 Kalev I. Sepp, Best Practices in Counterinsurgency (Ft Belvoir: Defense Technical Information 
Center, 2005), accessed November 10, 2011, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA485146.  
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analysis using Arreguín-Toft’s Strategic Interaction (STRATINT) argument as a 
framework.  As such, this paper only included case studies on conflicts that are 
considered indirect v. indirect.  Arreguín-Toft concluded that if the strong actor uses a 
matched strategy (direct v. direct or indirect v. indirect) then the strong actor wins over 
75 percent of the time.12  Yet when the strong actor does not use a matched strategy, the 
weak actor wins almost 65 percent of the time.  Figure 3 illustrates the STRATINT 
theory.   
 
Figure 3.   STRATINT Theory Results (From Arreguín-Toft, 2005)13 
The real question then is, when the strong actor does employ a matched strategy 
against a significantly weaker opponent: why do they still lose?  The following case 
studies were analyzed in an effort to identify key variables from the conflicts that can be 
exported to other indirect v. indirect conflicts:  French Algerian War, Dhofar Rebellion 
(Britain/Oman), and Huk Rebellion (U.S./Philippines).  These case studies were chosen 
as models of both victory and defeat for democratic strong actors to help identify key 
variables that led to success or defeat of the weak actor.  More importantly, the Dhofar 
Rebellion is understudied when compared to the British effort in Malaya, and the U.S. 
success in the Philippines is often overshadowed by its failure in Vietnam.  The paper 
then summarizes the key findings from the case study analysis and offers implications for 
defense policy makers and planners.  The goal is not to offer a new theoretical argument, 
but instead build upon the STRATINT theory and offer insight into defeating David.   
                                                 
12 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 45. 
13 Ibid. 
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II. ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT THEORIES AND GAPS 
Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without 
strategy is the noise before defeat. 
—Sun Tzu 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In his work on Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric 
Conflict, Andrew Mack contends that the primary reason the weak defeat the strong is 
simply because an interest asymmetry exists between the two principal actors.14  In 
general terms, the weak are fighting for their survival; whereas because the weak do not 
possess an invasion capability, then the strong actor’s survival is not at stake.15  “It 
means, crudely speaking, that for the insurgents the war is ‘total,’ while for the external 
power it is necessarily ‘limited.’” 16   Moreover, the weak do not have to defeat the strong 
militarily to win; they simply need to not lose.17  Because the weak actor understands this 
dynamic, the structure of the conflict itself presents three significant challenges for the 
strong actor.  First, the weak actor adopts an unconventional strategy and uses guerrilla 
warfare and terrorist tactics for the sole purpose of creating a protracted, psychologically 
exhausting war.  To do anything else, such as directly confront the military capability of 
the strong actor would be suicide.18  Second, it turns a would-be military conflict into a 
political war, and from day one the strong actor is fighting on borrowed time.  The strong 
actor has such an overwhelming force and resource advantage that it enters into the 
conflict with the expectation of quick and decisive victory.19  However, if victory is not 
achieved quickly, then political vulnerability begins.  Third, when the war is seen as 
                                                 
14 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World 
Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations 27 (1975): 175–200. 
15 Ibid. 





limited because the opponent is comparatively weak, then the prosecution of the war does 
not take priority over other competing political goals.20 
Mack points out that in any conflict there must be a political capability to wage 
war.  Initially, because there is no existential threat to the strong actor, it will not fully 
mobilize its forces to fight a limited war.21  Moreover, as the war becomes protracted 
because of the tactics used by the weak actor, the cost of the war increases politically.  
“[A] war with no visible payoff against an opponent who poses no direct threat will come 
under increasing criticism as battle-casualties rise and economic costs escalate.”22 
Eventually, the strong actor will become war weary, and there will be enough domestic 
opposition to end the conflict.  It is not a matter of resources, because clearly if 
survivability were on-the-line, then the strong actor would mobilize whatever it takes to 
win.  In essence, relative power by the strong actor creates interest asymmetry in a 
limited war and exposes the strong actor to political vulnerability, which explains why 
strong actors lose.   
Mack’s argument is based on sound logic and is the starting point for subsequent 
theories on asymmetric conflict.  One weakness is Mack’s contention that interest 
asymmetry by itself is sufficient to fully explain asymmetric conflict outcomes.  For 
example, interest asymmetry does not explain the increasing trend of weak actor victories 
over time.23  In addition, it does not explain strong actor quick and decisive victories in 
asymmetric conflicts when the weak actor fights non-conventionally with the purpose of 
creating a protracted war.24  Moreover, Mack’s theory does not address the domestic and 
popular conditions in the state where the war is fought. In exploring the U.S. involvement 
in Vietnam, he rightfully points that the war extended beyond the battlefield back to the 
social and political institutions of the United States.25  However, interest asymmetry did 
                                                 
20 Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 184. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 185. 
23 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 14.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 177–179. 
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not take into account the domestic social and political environment in Vietnam.  Factors 
such as popular support for the insurgency and lack of popular support for the U.S. 
backed South Vietnam government go a long way in explaining U.S. failure in Vietnam.   
In summary, interest asymmetry does a great job in identifying the political vulnerability 
of strong actors fighting limited wars, but falls short in fully explaining asymmetric 
conflict outcomes.  More importantly, although political vulnerability is relatively easy to 
understand regarding the strong actor; the question remains, what can be done to reduce 
this vulnerability?  Is it simply a structural condition of asymmetric conflicts that the 
strong actor can never mitigate?  Or, could a different approach or even a different type 
of force be used to reduce this risk?      
Building on Mack’s theory of interest asymmetry, Gil Merom adds in regime type 
as a variable, and contends that modern democracies have limited domestic political 
tolerance for protracted, indecisive wars.26   In essence, democracies fail in small wars 
because they are unable to escalate the level of violence and brutality necessary to win.  
Democratic societies do not understand the nature of small wars and have little tolerance 
for a long war that produces either high friendly casualties, extreme oppression of the 
insurgent indigenous population, or both.27  The dilemma democracies face in fighting 
small wars is identified by Merom as structural within its society, and he classifies the 
challenges as instrumental dependence, normative difference, and political relevance.28 
As defined by Merom:   
Instrumental dependence refers to the state’s degree of reliance on society 
to provide the resources, mostly manpower, needed to execute national 
policies. Normative difference refers to the distance between the position 
of the state and that of the liberal forces (that give meaning to the term 
society) concerning the legitimacy of the demand for sacrifice and brutal 
conduct.  Political relevance refers to the inherent degree of influence 
societal forces have over policy-choices or their outcomes.29  
                                                 
26 Gil Merom , How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in 
Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 18. 
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To be clear, the latter two (normative difference and political relevance) are 
unique to democracies.  Therefore, democracies fail in small (asymmetric) wars because 
of the difference between the state and its society over what is necessary to win a 
protracted, violent conflict in a distant land.30  In order to secure victory, democratic 
societies must be willing to endure high friendly casualties and enable its military to 
maximize violence against a much weaker enemy.  According to Merom, democracies 
simply do not have the stomach for it.   
Merom’s argument is intuitively logical.  Democratic societies are more open by 
comparison to authoritarian states.  It follows that people within democratic societies to a 
degree have to be on board with the policies established by its elected government as a 
mere matter of representation.  When a divide exists over the protracted nature of an 
asymmetric war, the strong state has little recourse other than to yield to the citizenry 
who have in essence ceded their authority to the elected state officials.  Merom’s theory 
clearly expands Mack’s theory of interest asymmetry.  However, Merom’s argument 
explaining asymmetric conflict outcomes is insufficient in several areas.   The first 
deficiency is (interestingly) addressed by Mack twenty years before Merom’s published 
work.  Citing the Portuguese experience in Africa, Mack contends internal divisions over 
policy exist in any state independent of regime type and has limited causality in 
explaining conflict outcome.31  The second weakness to Merom’s argument is logically it 
would follow that authoritarian states should have a better record than democratic states 
in fighting small wars; however, they do not.32  Moreover, Merom’s argument does not 
account for or explain instances where the democratic state used brutal tactics against a 
weak actor, such as the U.S. Phoenix program in Vietnam, and still lost.33  Regardless, 
Merom’s contribution is significant because it specifically addresses the domestic 
structure of the strong power in its ability to successfully wage a limited war.  More 
importantly, in today’s international system strong states, typically western democracies, 
                                                 
30 Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 179. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 16. 
33 Ibid. 
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have a responsibility to “get involved” even when their vital interests are not at stake.  
Once again the question needs to be asked is it simply a structural condition of 
asymmetric conflicts that the strong actor can never mitigate?  Or, could a different 
approach or even a different type of force be used to reduce this risk?  Clearly, 
understanding the indigenous societal and governance structure as well as what it takes to 
win a small war will assist strong actor policy makers in developing the appropriate 
political and military strategy to be successful.   
As previously discussed, no one theory by itself answers the question(s) 
concerning why strong actors lose to weak actors in asymmetric conflict.  However, to 
date, Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s Strategic Interaction (STRATINT) theory is the most 
complete.  In his 2005 book, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, 
Arreguín-Toft successfully demonstrated that if the strong actor employs the correct 
strategy then it will win over 75 percent of the time against a materially weaker 
adversary.34  Whereas, if the strong actor chooses the wrong strategy, then its weaker 
opponent will win over 60 percent of the conflict engagements.35  Arreguín-Toft breaks 
down the STRATINT possibilities into four scenarios with each actor controlling what 
strategy it employs.  In simple terms, the strong actor can either employ a direct or 
indirect offensive strategy, and the weak actor can choose either a direct or indirect 
defensive strategy.  He further defines direct versus indirect for each actor based on the 
following typology.  In a direct-direct engagement, strong actors use a conventional 
attack and the weak actor uses a conventional defense.  In an indirect-indirect 
engagement, the strong actor uses a strategy of barbarism and the weak actor employs a 
guerrilla warfare strategy.  Figure 4. is a matrix outlining conflict outcome based on the 
STRATINT theory.36  
 
                                                 





Figure 4.   STRATINT Theory Matrix (From Arreguín-Toft, 2005)37 
On the surface, Arreguín-Toft’s theory is also intuitively logical:  the key to 
victory is choosing the right strategy.  However, even as sound as his argument is, several 
gaps exist in his theory concerning indirect conflicts that merit additional research and 
consideration.  First, Arreguín-Toft contends that in conflicts where the strong actor 
chooses the correct strategy, then it will end quickly.38  While this assumption often 
holds true in a direct v. direct engagement, it fails to address the inherent protracted 
nature of indirect conflict.  Second, Arreguín-Toft’s labeling of “Barbarism” and 
“Guerrilla Warfare” as respective strategies for strong and weak powers in an indirect v. 
indirect conflict is problematic.39  These terms over simplify the strategies used by each 
actor and focuses on the ability (or inability) of the strong actor to defeat its enemy 
militarily with little regard for the other (social, economic, political) aspects of irregular 
warfare.  Third, Arreguín-Toft devotes little attention to analyzing the resources 
employed by the strong actor, and whether or not the strong actor is trained or has 
experience fighting an irregular war.  Clearly, the strong actor is materially superior; 
however, are there other competing interests that preclude the strong actor from bringing 
the full weight of its strength to the conflict?  More importantly, just because a strong 
actor chooses the correct strategy as defined by Arreguín-Toft, does not mean its military 
is adept at implementing the associated tactics.  Finally, Arreguín-Toft fails to distinguish 
the specific nature of a given conflict particularly when defining the indirect approach 
                                                 




used by both actors.  For example, what is the nature of the insurgency and its associated 
grievances?  Is it a nationalist movement?  Is it motivated by religion?  Is there a minority 
in power?  Moreover, there are clearly more tactics available to strong actors than just 
barbarism.  Did the strong actor primarily attempt to kill/capture the insurgents?  Did the 
strong actor attempt to isolate the population from the insurgents with re-location 
programs?  What type of force did the strong actor use?  Ignoring these additional 
considerations fundamentally reduces the STRATINT theory to the military aspect of 
asymmetric conflict.   In short, considering the exact nature of given conflict, as well as 
clearly defining the political environment, are not only critical to determining the 
appropriate counter-strategy, but also in determining conflict outcome.            
One final argument describing asymmetric conflict outcomes that warrants its 
own category of attention is Jeffrey Record’s contention that there are no modern 
examples of successful major insurgent wars unassisted by foreign help.40  Moreover, 
external help to the weaker side can reduce, even eliminate, material disparity between 
strong and weak actors.   In his book, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win, Record 
examines eleven insurgent wars from 1775 to the present and concludes that external 
assistance is a stronger explanation for insurgent success than any other theory.  He does 
not discredit the importance of the three competing theories outlined above: interest 
asymmetry (Mack), strategic interaction (Arreguín-Toft), and strong actor regime type 
(Merom).  Moreover, Record acknowledges that foreign help is a significant enabler, but 
does not suggest that it guarantees success for weak actors.  “It is, of course, impossible 
in any of these [insurgent] cases to determine with certitude whether external assistance 
was decisive or even whether it contributed more to the weaker side’s victory than 
superior insurgent will and strategy.  To argue that an insurgency could not have won 
without foreign help is not to claim that external assistance was the decisive factor.”41  
However, Record contends that weak actor victories almost always depend on some 
combination of strong political will (survival), proper strategy, and external assistance.42  
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Record’s contribution is important because he highlights a variable that was not 
emphasized by the other leading asymmetric conflict theories.  However, just as Record 
is critical of the other theories for spending little attention on the value of external 
assistance, it is also essential not to over emphasize its importance.  Indeed there is a need 
to consider external assistance as a variable in analyzing asymmetric conflict outcomes, 
particularly as it enables the weak actor to protract the conflict exposing the political 
vulnerability of the strong actor.  In addition, external assistance can help close the gap in 
relative (and real) power by providing advanced military equipment to the weak actor.43  
The clearest example for the importance of this argument is the U.S. decision to provide 
Stinger missiles to the Mujahadin to combat the Soviet assault helicopters in the 1979–89 
Afghan war.  More important than external assistance; however, is indigenous or popular 
assistance.  Yes, the weak actor must obtain assistance (people, guns, and money) in 
order to survive, but these logistical sources at the basic (survival) level primarily exist 
within the population.  The weak actor’s ability (or inability) to hide among the people is 
far more critical to its survival than receiving foreign assistance.44  More importantly, 
what strategy (military, economic, political) should the strong actor use to mitigate both 
internal and to a lesser extent, external assistance?  Like the previous theories, by adding 
the variable of external assistance, even in conjunction with the other three theories, still 
does not answer the fundamental question about why weak actors are able to overcome 
its stronger opponent. 
B. THESIS RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The value in summarizing and evaluating the major theories on asymmetric 
conflict outcomes is that it helps to identify any areas not adequately addressed by the 
existing literature.  Several areas that require additional consideration are missing.  First, 
in all four theories outlined above, not one considers in detail the exact nature of the 
weak actor and the type of insurgency it is fighting.  This analysis needs to go beyond the 
type of military strategy (indirect) and tactics (guerrilla warfare/terrorism) used, and 
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instead needs to focus specifically on the nature of insurgency and its grievances with the 
existing governance structure.  How can a strong actor develop a proper counter-strategy 
if it does not understand the nature of its opponent, and not only what it has to work 
against, but also what it has to work with?  While all four theories appear to address it, 
not one accounts for popular support of the weak actor as the deciding factor in the 
conflict outcome.  When in fact the ability (or inability) of the strong actor to isolate the 
weak actor from the population and deliver the essential services such as security, 
healthcare, education, and infrastructure may be the most important factor in determining 
the conflict outcome.  Second, what type of force did the strong actor use?  Was it a force 
trained in irregular warfare with experience in conducting counterinsurgency?  Did the 
strong actor use indigenous forces to supplement its effort?  This question specifically 
addresses if the strong actor used the right tool (force) for the job.  Finally, were there 
any domestic or international constraints levied on the strong actor?   Were there 
domestic economic issues, or another conflict, that precluded the strong actor from using 
its full capacity?  Was there international pressure (or norms) that precluded the strong 
actor from implementing its military and political agenda?  In sum, the only way for the 
strong actor to develop the appropriate strategy is to not only fully understand the nature 
of its enemy, but to also understand the operating environment—both at home and 
abroad.  Failure to account for these factors will likely mean a decreased winning 
percentage for strong actors engaged in an irregular war against a significantly weaker 
adversary. 
Based on the potential theoretical gaps identified in the contemporary literature, 
the following four questions were developed for each case study: 
1. Was the strong actor an internal or external counterinsurgent force? 
2. Did the strong actor have any COIN experience? 
3. How was the strong actor constrained? 
4. Did the strong actor deploy a force skilled in irregular warfare?  
Each case study chapter will have the same structure.   It will begin by covering 
the background of each conflict and then cover the nature of the insurgency and the 
indirect strategy used by the insurgent force.  Finally, it will evaluate the 
 16 
counterinsurgent force through the lens of the research questions posed above to see if 
any of these factors are important in determining asymmetric conflict outcomes beyond 
an insurgent/counterinsurgent matched strategy. 
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III. CASE STUDY: FRENCH-ALGERIAN WAR (1954–1962) 
It is inconceivable that Algeria should secede from Metropolitan France. 
This should be clear forever to all, in Algeria, in Metropolitan France, 
and abroad. France will never, no Parliament, no Government will ever, 
yield on this basic principle. Algeria is France, and not a foreign country 
under our protection. 
—M. Mendes-France, November 1, 1954 
A. BACKGROUND 
The French conquest of Algeria began in 1830 when King Charles X gave the 
order to invade in an attempt to save his weak regime.45  However, even after more than 
120 years of French presence, France failed to fully integrate the indigenous Algerian 
population resulting in the start of a nationalist bloody rebellion on November 1, 1954.  
Soon after France’s initial invasion, French citizens along with other Europeans from 
along the Mediterranean often referred to as either colons, or pied-noirs, began to settle in 
Algeria for both adventurous and economic reasons.46 In 1834, French King Louis 
Philippe, Charles X’s successor, annexed Algeria and issued a subsequent decree to 
conquer all of its territory in 1840.47  More importantly, French citizenship was not 
extended to the local Arabs and Berbers of Algeria, and instead they were subjected to 
special French police and military laws.48  As a result, complete subjugation of Algeria 
did not take place until 1857 because of the skillful Algerian resistance led by Abd el-
Kader.49  Opposition by Algeria’s population not only stemmed from the brutal treatment 
carried out by French authorities, but it was also due to the Algerian attachment to land 
and to Islam.  French colonization not only completely devastated the basic structure of 
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Algerian society, but by the beginning of the 20th century, the colons had also acquired 
all of Algeria’s most fertile agricultural lands.50 
France established the office of Governor-General in Algeria 1871; however, 
nearly all the responsibility for governing Algeria remained in metropolitan France until 
1896 when the Governor-General assumed primary administration responsibility for 
Algeria.51  Prior to 1871, France did attempt to make some concessions to the Algerian 
population.  In 1865, France made local Algerians French subjects and granted them 
access to minor civil administrative functions as well as permission to enter the French 
Army.  However, in order to obtain French citizenship, an Algerian would have to 
abandon his status under Muslim civil laws.52  Although major political and economic 
inequities between French citizens and French subjects always existed, the real problems 
emerged after World War I when French-educated Muslims and former Muslim soldiers 
of the French Army began to demand equality.  Prior to the inter-war period, any 
movement by the local population to increase their voice in national affairs was quelled 
by the colons.  As such, disparities between French citizens and subjects became the focal 
issue for the various nationalist movements in Algeria.53  
In addition to the Algerian Communist Party, three major nationalist movements 
within the Muslim community emerged during the inter-war period to address the 
colonial inequalities.54  First, was the MTLD (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic 
Liberties), which is the organization most closely associated with the 1954 revolution.55  
Led by Messali Ahmed ben Hadj, the MTLD advocated complete independence from 
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France and sought both Islamic economic and social reforms.56  Second, there was the 
UDMA (Democratic Union for the Algerian Manifesto), led by Fehrat Abbas and Dr. 
Ben Djelloul, which was mainly comprised of French-educated intellectuals.  The 
UDMA goals were total assimilation into France and political equality within Algeria.57  
Third, was the Association of the Ulemas. Led by Ben Badis, the Ulemas were primarily 
a religious organization that was comprised of Orthodox Muslims offended by French 
control of their religion.  Like the MTLD, they wanted independence from France, they 
opposed French culture, and wanted to make Arabic the official language of Algeria.58 
Under the Vichy Regime after the fall of France in 1940, the situation became 
worse for the Muslims.  The colons actually pushed for self-determination and agrarian 
reforms in an effort to gain full Muslim support during WWII.  However, on May 8, 1945 
“Liberation Day,” the colons reacted swiftly to nationalist pressure for reforms, and 
carried out a brutal repression to quell a Muslim uprising.59  The uprising in 1945 did 
include indiscriminate killing of Europeans by Muslim mobs.  However, the French 
repression that followed was even more brutal.  Several thousand Muslims were killed or 
executed, and another 4,500 were arrested, and 151 sentenced to death.60 
The Statute of 1947 was the last hope of political reform before the 1954 
revolution when the French National Assembly created the Algerian Assembly, which 
along with the Governor-General, were supposed to govern Algeria.61 The assembly was 
comprised of 120 seats split into two colleges.  The first college contained elected colons 
along with certain educated Muslims, and the second college of the remaining 
Muslims.62  While French law concerning Algeria was complex, the Algerian Assembly 
was the first institution that gave Algerians sizeable representation; however, the 
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inequities between the two populations remained stark.63  In essence, one European vote 
equaled nine Muslim votes and enabled the colons to dominate the legislative process 
through effective veto.64  “If the Statute of 1947 proclaimed the Algerian equal to the 
European colon, it did not make him so either in fact or in law.”65 
Following the Chinese communist model for revolution, the Algerian nationalists 
realized it must first develop a strong unified revolutionary party.  Up until the spring of 
1954, the disparate nationalist organizations had failed to gain any political ground or 
achieve a common party program.  Therefore, in July 1954, nine members of the 
paramilitary arm of the MTLD created the CRUA (Revolutionary Committee for Unity 
and Action) in Cairo, Egypt with the full support of Egyptian President Nasser.66  Since 
all political attempts for reform had failed up to this point, the group decided that the only 
solution was direct action.67  The CRUA met in October 1954 and set November 1 as the 
date to launch the Algerian revolution.  On the morning of 1 November after the first 
wave of attacks, the CRUA adopted a new name:  FLN (Front de Liberation 
Nationale).68 
B. INSURGENT FORCE–INDIRECT STRATEGY 
The Algerian nationalism that spawned the 1954 revolution combined Islamic and 
pan-Arab ideologies with the communist revolutionary concepts and native 
egalitarianism.69  “The main political goal of the revolution itself was national 
independence and the ‘restoration of the sovereign, democratic and social Algerian state 
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within the framework of Islamic principles.’”70  The FLN leaders almost exclusively 
came from the lower-middle and lower class of Algerian society, and they modeled 
themselves after the Chinese theory of revolution—revolution based on the masses.71  
The FLN generation had served in the French army during WWII.  “Having contributed a 
great deal to the defeat of the Nazis and to the liberation of France, Algerian soldiers 
expected to be granted Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. Instead, they got the Setif 
repression of 1945, a rude reminder of the horrible reality: inequality would always 
remain.”72  Like the Chinese revolutionary model, they wanted land redistribution, state 
direction, and nationalization of public utilities.  They became convinced that direct 
action was the only way to achieve independence.   Having succeeded in establishing a 
unified party with the formation of the CRUA/FLN, the next step in the Chinese 
revolutionary theory was to obtain popular support.73   
In October 1954, the CRUA created the National Liberation Army (ALN) to 
execute their direct action strategy against the French administration and to exert pressure 
and influence over the population.74  Additionally, to execute command and control of 
nationalist forces, the CRUA divided Algeria into six wilayas (provinces) depicted in 
Figure 5:  
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Figure 5.   Six Provinces used by Algerian Nationalists (From Heggoy, 1972) 75 
The wilayas were then subdivided into mintakas (zones) commanded by a Major 
or Captain, nahias (sectors) led by a Lieutenant, and finally kasmas (districts) led by a 
senior NCO.76  Initially, the ALN was not developed beyond large and small bands of 
rebel forces loosely organized and ill-equipped to challenge the French forces 
conventionally.77  Between 1954–56 the nationalists tried to conventionally organize the 
ALN to fight the French for territory.  However, repeated failures forced the rebels to 
adopt a different policy.  By the end of 1956, the ALN units began to split into even 
smaller factions as the nationalists realized they could not defeat the French militarily.78  
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Areas of Operation Regulars Auxiliaries Total 
Oran 1,250 3,000 4,250 
Kabylia and Mitidja 
Plain around Algiers 
2,000 6,000 8,000 
North Constantine 1,700 5,000 6,700 
East Constantine 1,300 4,000 5,300 
South Constantine 1,800 3,000 4,800 
TOTALS: 8,050 21,000 29,050 
Table 1.   Force Estimates for Algerian National Army (From Galula, 2006)79 
According to David Galula, who served as a company commander in the Kablyia 
region from 1956 to 1958, the initial rebel strategy consisted of a preliminary period of 
“blind” terrorism, followed by selective terrorism, and then village consolidation.  Blind 
terrorism was designed to not only attract attention to their cause, but to also spread the 
feeling of insecurity throughout Algeria.80  Selective terrorism, which specifically 
targeted French officials, followed and lasted throughout the war as the primary means to 
control the population.81  To this end, the rebels targeted Muslims working in the French 
Administration or anyone suspected of being pro-France.82  Additionally, they began to 
raise the political conscious of the masses, and forcibly involve the Muslim population in 
the revolution.   Rebel leaders would quickly enlist young men, and force them to 
participate in a violent act against the French.  Once the recruit became an outlaw and 
implicated his entire family, he was then forced to remain part of the rebellion.  “The 
Algerian nationalists understood the ways of the traditional society within which they 
operated; they comprehended the depth of family ties and of other group allegiances; and 
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they exploited this knowledge.”83  Moreover, the guerrillas saw no need to persuade a 
majority of the masses; in any community all the ALN needed was active support of 
around 20 percent of the population.  The remainder could be controlled.84  Given the 
widespread dissatisfaction with the French, 20 percent was easily won over.  The rebels 
only needed to eliminate a small minority of French supporters.  Using these techniques, 
support for the nationalists rose steadily during the onset of the revolution.85  The ALN 
followed success in each locality by establishing of a Political Administrative cell to 
perform tasks that were not military related such as collect taxes and administer justice.86  
They facilitated ALN protection in the village.  Moreover, it was the presence of these 
cells among the population the prevented the locals from providing intelligence to the 
French authority.87  However, “[t]he insurgency did not spread at once all over Algeria; it 
did so slowly, area by area, very often jumping over territory in between as if insurgent 
cadres had been injected from the outside.”88 
Therefore, the strategic objective of the FLN was to keep the revolution alive, and 
develop it from rebellion to full-scale civil war.89  In reality, the November 1, 1954, 
uprising launched by a small number of ill-equipped and isolated Algerians yielded little 
to the FLN.  However, it led to a decisive turn in Franco-Algerian relations by rekindling 
the Algerian nationalist movement.  Since the Algerian nationalists were not equipped to 
confront the French forces directly, the tactic was to fall back into the inaccessible rural 
areas, where the French influence was virtually non-existent, engage in guerrilla warfare 
to give demonstrations of its continued existence, and recruit the local population.90  The 
ALN planted a few rebels in remote villages to win over the population for people, guns, 
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and money as well as hiding places.  From these initial spots, they would penetrate in 
widening circles to neighboring areas, eventually reaching the settled areas of French 
control.   
ALN operations resembled an oil spot on a blotter.91  ALN strategy revolved 
around seizing control of a remote village where French presence was light.  It was not 
difficult to persuade a village who may have never seen a European official, in some 
cases, the ALN simply filled a power vacuum.92  From there, French control would be 
broken by guerrilla and terrorist action, or as a result of severe French repression, which 
often followed the attacks.   In urban centers, terrorism alone was used.  Outside urban 
centers “hit and run” tactics were used to avoid direct combat with the superior French 
forces.93  “In every operation, the Algerians enjoy a basic advantage: their seemingly 
omnipresent civilian auxiliary, who serve as ‘human radar,’ scouts, intelligence agents, 
and guides.”94  ALN guerrilla units acted on the population through persuasion and the 
use of terror.  The ALN would target French-run villages by assassinating French 
appointed officials forcing the population to support the ALN.  Once compromised, the 
villages had no choice but to support the ALN.  However, the ALN also integrated 
themselves with the local population, by providing them with an effective administration, 
rule-of-law to settle feuds, protection from raids, and often establishing schools and 
medical facilities.95  
The use of terrorism by ALN primarily involved intimidation, assassination, and 
indiscriminate bombing.96  French-Muslims and rival nationalist leaders were first 
warned by letters to stop cooperating with French authorities.  Those who did not were 
assassinated, and a letter with the ALN crest was pinned to the victim.  This technique 
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silenced any local opposition to the FLN, disrupted the French effort to gain local 
support, and raised the prestige of the FLN as an effective organization.  Indiscriminate 
bombing primarily targeted the European population creating a tense atmosphere of 
suspicion and widened the divide among the two communities.  It also brought about 
violent measures of French repression that further antagonized the Muslim community.  
Additionally, it forced the French to station more troops in the urban centers to enforce 
martial law/curfews relieving some of the pressure on ALN forces in the rural 
communities.97 
The nationalists preferred to use terrorism because it was cheaper in both 
manpower and materials.  Additionally, instead of searching for enemy companies, the 
French had to deal with multiple fragmented units that could attack at will and then 
disappear.  In the early stages of the war, the French sought to seek out and destroy the 
FLN-ALN; however, the French success only forced the nationalists to divide into 
smaller units.  “Because the different methods used by the French and the rebels to gain 
control over the masses, the disproportionate military advantage of the French was not 
decisive.”98  Each side realized that victory could not be achieved without controlling the 
population.  “Failure to obey rebel directives often brought mutilation or execution of 
uncooperative Algerians; on the other hand, when Arabs and Berbers who engaged in 
nationalistic, but non-military activities were captured by the French, they customarily 
only received only a short prison term.”99  The choice was easy, and it is easy to 
understand why locals were reluctant to support the French when a small pocket of the 
ALN remained in a region.  The French Army had to adapt to what scholars in France 
referred to as revolutionary warfare.100 
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C. COIN FORCE–INDIRECT STRATEGY 
1. Variable 1: Was the Strong Actor an External or Internal 
Counterinsurgent Force? 
While there is no single reason for the outbreak of the 1954 revolution, it is hard 
to look past the disparate ethnic, political, and economic gap between the French and the 
Algerians that existed for over 120 years as the root cause.101  What makes the French 
case unique is France considered itself the legitimate government of Algeria.  As such, 
France’s suppression of the revolution was considered a legitimate use of force by a 
sovereign state on its domestic populace.  However, although France believed Algeria 
was a part of France, the French were a gross minority and were colonizers in every 
sense.  The French adopted an Algerian policy that consisted of repression tempered with 
reform.102  Algeria would remain a part of France, and the French plan was to eliminate 
the insurgent threat while implementing the reforms of the 1947 statute.  However, 
Algerian Muslims were discriminated in all facets of life—politically, economically, and 
socially.  Berber and Arab pride suffered constant insults in their daily lives.  For 
example, Algerians were excluded from certain beaches that were designated only for 
Europeans.103  To make matters worse, the French discrimination was backed by the 
power of the French army.  Many Algerians saw autonomy as the only solution, and 
autonomy and independence were only a step apart.104    
The 1954 census of Algeria listed a total population of over 9.5 million, of which 
only a little over 1 million were European, leaving approximately 8.5 million Muslims of 
both Arab and Berber descent.105  Of the Europeans, roughly 450 thousand were French, 
325 thousand Spanish, and 100 thousand of Italian ancestry.  Around 150 thousand were 
Jews of North African, Spanish and Italian origin, as well as another 50 thousand of 
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Maltese origin.106  By 1954, 89 percent of the Europeans who lived there had been born 
in Algeria.107  As such, they, the colons, considered Algeria theirs.  Moreover, French is 
the predominant language of the Europeans, even though a small percentage did speak 
Arabic and Berber as a second language.  Naturally, Arabic was the predominant 
language of the Muslims; however, most of the Muslim city dwellers achieved varying 
degrees of fluency in French.108   
Despite the fact that nearly 90 percent of the population was indigenous, there 
was a tremendous political inequality.  The 1947 Statute, which was supposed to give 
Muslims some measure of self-determination, was never fully realized.  The passage of 
the statute was an attempt to address the situation; however, the creation of two unequal 
electoral colleges, one elected by the Europeans, and one elected by the natives only 
exacerbated the inequities.  As previously mentioned, the Paris appointed Governor-
General had veto power over any legislation deemed detrimental to French interests.  
Moreover, the powers of the Algerian assembly were limited as it was excluded from 
deliberating “all laws guaranteeing constitutional liberties, all laws of property, marriage, 
and personal status…, applying to military and civilian departments or posts”109 
Coupled with the political inequities, the Algerian masses were poor.  Nearly 60 
percent were classified as indigent.110  “[T]he vast majority of Algerian Muslims had an 
average annual income of only about $45.”111  Seeing the wealthy Europeans reminded 
the poor Muslims daily of their inferior status.  Algeria also suffered from low 
productivity, large-scale unemployment among the Muslims, and tremendous population 
growth.  A predominate agricultural economy, Algeria produced only enough foodstuffs 
to feed two-thirds of its population, and production failed to keep step with population 
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growth.112  More importantly, not only did the Europeans have farms several times larger 
than Algerian Muslims, the most fertile land was seized by French settlers.  Most Muslim 
farmers were forced to work small land plots that not only yielded lower income per acre, 
but could also not meet the basic food requirements.113  Most farmers were forced to 
work as either as agricultural laborers on the large European combines or as industrial 
employees inside Algeria or France.  However, the agricultural work was seasonal, and 
the combined industrial capacity of France and Algeria could only absorb approximately 
600 thousand Algerians.  The result was gross unemployment.  In 1954, unemployment 
was estimated at 500 thousand; however, that figure would easily exceed 2 million, 
nearly 25 percent of the population, when both male and females were factored.114 
Social tensions between the colons and Algerian Muslims arose from two main 
sources.  First, the colons had a mentality of superiority over the Muslims.115 The fact 
that the French settlers were able to “modernize” Algeria fed to their feeling of 
superiority.  Second, the colons feared reprisal by the Muslims.  The propaganda, “the 
suitcase or the coffin,” produced by the Algerian nationalists, specifically threatened 
violence against the Europeans, created insecurity among the colons causing them either 
to leave Algeria, or arm and fortify their communities.116  In 1956, when the French 
Army finally gained the military initiative from the Algerian nationalists, the colons 
demanded that Paris create military tribunals to remove the guerrilla prisoners from the 
overcrowded civilian court system as well as demanded harsher/capital punishment.117  
More importantly, the colons sought to preserve their status at all costs, and therefore 
blocked any form of legislation from Paris or the Governor-General that would upset the 
status quo. 
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Despite France’s attempt to declare Algeria a domestic issue, in every area, politically, 
economically, socially the French were an invader, an external force.  Moreover, to the 
mindset of the Algerian Muslim, the French swore they would never leave Indochina—
and yet they left.  The French swore they would never leave Tunisia—and yet the left.  
The French swore they would never leave Morocco—and yet they left.118  Ultimately, 
the Algerian Muslims viewed the promise of French reforms as a sign of weakness, and it 
only solidified their position that violent direct action was the best path to achieve 
independence.   
2. Variable 2: Did the Strong Actor have any COIN Experience? 
Generally speaking, the French had experience in counterinsurgency from their 
campaigns in Indochina as well as the revolutions in Morocco and Tunisia.  In addition, 
the French adjusted their conventional military tactics in Algeria to contend with 
FLN/ALN and militarily seized the initiative from the nationalists by 1956.  However, 
even with their COIN experience, the 1954 revolution caught France by surprise.  More 
importantly, the French were not only slow to react, which afforded the nationalists time 
to begin controlling the population, but they also employed a conventional force to fight a 
counterinsurgency.  These two blunders were costly.  The relative quiet following the 
1945 uprising created a false sense of security for France.  As such, the French 
underestimated the scale of the revolution and the type of force required to quell it.  The 
French believed it was another tribal uprising that could be crushed relatively easily.  
When it became apparent that this was indeed a revolution, the French were ill-prepared 
to deal with it.  “It lacked units in France suitable for this kind of warfare.”119  The 
French Irregular Warfare experienced troops had yet to return from Indochina and the 
units that were initially sent to Algeria were conventional forces created for a European 
war.  “Heavy and massive, equipped to fight a frontal war, they proved to be proved to be 
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un-adaptable to the geographic conditions of combat in Algeria, and ineffectual against 
the extremely flexible techniques of guerrilla warfare.”120 
Initially, the French response was ill equipped to handle local conditions.  During 
the first 15 months of the revolution, the French Army employed small scale combing 
operations.  Multiple battalions would mass—tipping the enemy of their intentions, 
encircle an area where guerrilla action had taken place, and then arrest all known 
nationalists as well as disarm the clans and tribes.  The rebels also continuously 
outmaneuvered superior French units, whose transport vehicles were of no use in the 
rugged terrain.121  This left the pro-French Algerian’s defenseless against the ALN, 
yielded almost nothing, and only served to alienate more and more Muslims.122  
Moreover, the French tactics provided the rebels a feeling of identity among the 
population.  After the outbreak of the revolution, Algerian grievances were multiplied by 
the countermeasures of the French authority.123  In the first few months of the revolution, 
the French carried out a campaign against the rebels without any clear objective.  They 
were not officially at war.  The small rebel force, supported by the civilian population 
was invisible to the French.  Precious time was lost as the French struggled to adapt their 
techniques and equipment to a new kind of conflict.  The only veterans were soldiers who 
had served in Indochina.  More importantly, the French lacked a COIN doctrine.124  The 
French essentially tried to enforce the 1947 statute granting the Algerian Muslims a 
larger voice in the colonial government.  However, while it may have won over some 
support had it been instituted in 1947, by 1954, it was “too little, too late;” particularly 
after the revolution was underway.125  On 1 November 1, 1954, 56 thousand French 
faced approximately 400 rebels.126  By April 1956, the number had risen to 250 
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thousand, while intelligence estimates put the FLN/ALN at around eight thousand.  
However, they remained evasive, blending in with the population.127    
In April 1956, using lessons from their experience in Indochina, the French 
adopted the strategy of pacification, which would be achieved by creating Special 
Administrative Sections to re-establish contact and governance for under-governed areas 
throughout Algeria and by applying quadrillage tactics.128  Quadrillage effectively 
applied a grid to the entire country dividing up into small units with the military 
garrisoning and controlling all movement.129  Additionally, the French military presence 
was increased to 400,000 troops; jet fighters were replaced with slower ground support 
planes and helicopters.  The borders with Tunisian and Morocco were thoroughly fenced 
off to cut the supply lines of the ALN, and areas with heavy ALN concentration were 
declared security zones.  The locals in the security zones were moved into resettlement 
camps; all villages and hamlets were burned.  Only French forces were allowed into 
security zones with orders to shoot anything that moved.  The tracking of ALN forces 
was then left to small and mobile elite units that were handpicked, generally paratroopers.  
There were never more than about 50 thousand paratroopers, which was roughly the size 
of the ALN.  The effectiveness of the French tactics forced the FLN/ALN to step up 
terrorist attacks in urban areas in an effort to disrupt the French pacification strategy.130 
Additionally, the French created a Center for the Teaching of Pacification and 
Counter-Guerrilla to prepare the French soldiers for the nature of revolutionary 
warfare.131  They also built internment camps, catalogued people and houses, and 
systematically destroyed small villages forcing resettlement.132  However, politically the 
pitfalls exceeded the military gains.  If a new security zone village prospered, then the 
French received credit; however, if it failed to become a viable economic and social unit 
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then the nationalists quickly infiltrated and often operated under the noses of the 
French.133  Throughout the security zones, the French controlled all income, travel, and 
transportation.134  However, through propaganda the FLN exploited the negative aspects 
of the re-location policy.135  The French threat of re-location caused many Algerians to 
emigrate to Tunisia and Morocco.  These people were not only lost to the French cause, 
but were also alienated from their own country.136 
The French adapted themselves to the insurgency by changing military 
institutions as well as the political and economic nature of Algeria, which enabled the 
French army to regain the military initiative by 1956.137  The three primary COIN tools: 
(Special Administrative Sections, quadrillage, and the resettlement system) deprived the 
nationalists of their mobility and a great deal of material and popular support.138  In 
addition, the barriers reduced infiltration from Morocco and Tunisia.139  Although the 
French adapted well, their government ultimately lost the desire to hold Algeria.   
3. Variable 3: How was the Strong Actor Constrained? 
Overall, it can be argued that France was not constrained either domestically or 
internationally in their effort to defeat the Algerian nationalists.  At the onset of the 1954 
Revolution, France was in fact over-extended militarily dealing with unrest in Morocco, 
Tunisia, as well as Indochina, which hampered its initial response to Algeria.  In addition, 
the majority of French forces with experience in counter-insurgency warfare were still 
deployed to Vietnam.  However, the outbreak of the revolution in Algeria affected the 
French decision to complete the negotiations with Morocco and Tunisia.140  Simply 
stated, the French decided to cut their losses in Morocco and Tunisia and focus their 
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efforts on Algeria.  Having suffered a series of humiliating defeats in their colonies, the 
French people would not accept failure again.141  As a result, France put all its efforts 
into Algeria and, by the end of the war, had deployed nearly five-hundred thousand 
forces in Algeria.  Moreover, the French military had felt they had been stabbed in the 
back by the politicians in Paris for their defeat in Indochina.  “French military honor 
required a success to vindicate the earlier failure.  No compromise would be made with 
the FLN-ALN.  Indeed, a French solution to the Algerian question would have to be 
imposed.”142   
France also did not self-impose limitations on the use of violence to counter the 
FLN/ALN terrorist tactics.  Paris granted Governor-General State of Emergency powers 
and life for rebels became more precarious.143  France’s willingness to imprison and 
torture nationalist sympathizers is best characterized by their efforts during the Battle of 
Algiers.  The French conducted a census in Algiers in January 1957 and identification 
cards were issued to all inhabitants.  The French then sealed off the Muslim sector in the 
Casbah, and check points were established at the gates and all strategic intersections.144  
Anyone wanting to enter the Casbah had to clear these checkpoints and the French 
conducted random ratissages (raking operations) which were essentially cordon and 
search of specific neighborhoods looking for suspicious persons, weapons, and 
propaganda.145   The French also used a system called ilots (islands) where one person in 
each family was responsible for the whereabouts of all other family members.  The 
responsible man on every floor of a building reported to a building chief, who was 
responsible to a city block chief.  This enabled the French to reach out and touch any 
Muslim in the Casbah within a few minutes.146  
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Additionally, General Jacques Massu from the 10th Parachute Division was given 
police powers to maintain peace in the capital.147  Massu authorized the use of torture, 
which enabled soldiers to root out terrorists and protect many more innocent people.  In 
short, Massu excused the brutality of the French on the grounds of expediency.148  The 
use of torture, however, provided the nationalists justification for their use of terrorist 
violence.  The nationalists openly recognized they could not fight the French 
conventionally, and without some notable successes to hit the French, they would lose 
their popular support.149  Interestingly, Algerians who had first reacted negatively toward 
the use of terrorist tactics gradually began to approve of the extreme measures after 
Massu took over. 150  Although most nationalists and urban terrorists were captured or 
killed, Massu’s methods created solidarity among the Algerian population, strengthening 
support for the nationalists.  By September 1957, Algiers was completely under French 
control, and Massu’s tactics were applied to all other urban centers effectively 
eliminating terrorist attacks.151  The battle of Algiers was a tactical victory, but the 
strategic victory belonged to the rebels who gained from Massu’s brutal tactics.  If it was 
even possible, the distinction between Algerians and Europeans became even markedly 
clearer, causing the two communities to drift further apart.152 
Although the plight of the Algerian nationalists did receive international attention, 
there was no concerted effort placed on France by the international community to settle 
the Algerian question peacefully.  France had maintained that Algeria was a legal part of 
France, and therefore, the United Nations (UN) had no jurisdiction over a domestic 
issue.153  However, in September 1955, the UN General Assembly by the margin of one 
vote agreed to put the Algerian question on its agenda.  Undeterred, Paris responded to 
the UN vote by removing its delegation to the UN General Assembly in October 1955, 
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and by imposing Martial Law in Algeria and granting special powers to the Governor-
General in March 1956.154  Although the issue of Algeria came before the UN annually, 
France was able to keep the UN from adopting any meaningful resolutions.155  In fact, 
France did more to keep Algeria in the international news by making mistakes that 
brought attention to the nationalist cause.  For example, French airplanes bombed a 
Tunisian village used by ALN rebels, French forces kidnapped a rebel leader in Morocco, 
and they captured a ship in international waters with weapons bound for rebel forces in 
Algeria.156  These acts countered France’s claim that Algeria was a domestic issue. 
Clearly, France was not seriously constrained domestically or internationally 
during their campaign in Algeria.  In fact, the French went “all in” and raised the level of 
violence beyond its societal norms, which included the use of torture, to try and secure a 
victory.  Militarily, France had defeated the ALN by 1958; however, gradually France 
lost its political will under the new de Gaulle regime157 
4. Variable 4: Did the Strong Actor deploy a Force skilled in Irregular 
Warfare?  
The French adapted themselves on the military level to combat the Algerian 
nationalist insurgency.158  By 1958, France had won the military victory and took the 
initiative away from the insurgents.  However, the FLN-ALN shifted the focus from 
military to political objectives and robbed the French of victory.159 Although the French 
adapted themselves to counter the terrorist tactics used by the nationalists, they were slow 
in placing a non-conventional force on the ground to align both a military and political  
strategy to not only provide security, but also provide effective governance and earn 
popular support.  Put simply, France failed initially to recognize the Algerian population 
was the conflict’s center of gravity. 
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In mid-1956, the French Army in Algeria largely consisted of reservists and 
conscripts.  In Indochina, not only were professional soldiers used, but also a large 
portion of the fighting force was not French.  As such, relatively few French families 
were directly affected by the war in Indochina.160  However, with over one million 
Europeans living there, the effort to defend Algeria was much more uncompromising.161  
Because there were simply not enough professional soldiers, France drafted large 
numbers of young men, which completely changed the complexion of the French 
Army.162  Frequently, these conscripted, conventional soldiers had to be explained the 
difference between European France and African France.163  These young conventional 
soldiers were simply not prepared to combat the guerrilla tactics used by the ALN.  
Additionally, the use of these young non-volunteers brought the harsh reality of warfare 
much closer to home for French families that factored heavily into France’s political will. 
The French conventional forces were constantly frustrated by the impossible task 
of identifying guerrilla forces among the population.  In order to protect the population 
and gain popular support, the French forces needed to not only live among the 
population, both civil and military, but also establish governance that would connect 
villages with Algiers.  However, the French conventional forces were unaccustomed to 
guerrilla warfare, and most commanders simply did not gear up for occupation.164  In 
addition, the French use of ratissages was completely ineffective.  After a search of an 
area, the soldiers left to search another area leaving the population vulnerable to the 
rebels.  Those French soldiers who had fought in Indochina quickly understood the nature  
of the conflict in Algeria.  “The ALN fought for the minds of men, not for territory; to 
win this conflict the French military establishment would also have to fight ‘in the 
crowd.’”165 
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Following their military successes against the ALN, the French began to shift 
their attention to the population.  They created Specialized Administrative Sections with 
the task of bringing French administration to the rural areas within the quadrillage 
system attempting to provide basic services and construction projects.166  Arab speaking 
French officers were sent to work with the population to build schools, provide medical 
and dental care, create jobs, and build village self-defense forces, aka Harka units.167  
Officers were assigned two tasks: 1) re-establish contact between the government and the 
people, and 2) Gather intel.168  Additionally, the French attempted to attract more 
Muslims to government civil service to 1) spread governmental influence and reduced the 
widespread unemployment 2) raise status of Algerian employees by giving them 
management positions, 3) raise minimum wage for agricultural workers.169  These new 
laws challenged the FLN/ALN and reacted by violently condemning any peasant who 
profited from these reforms would be considered an enemy of the people.  Thus, 
Algerians who might have been tempted to accept civil service positions were threatened 
with death.170 As the Special Administration System became successful, it forced the 
FLN to call a conference in Soummam valley to resolve internal differences and devise a 
program to counter the French gains.171   
By the time the Special Administrative Sections had been instituted, the 
nationalists had done too much damage to French prestige and established fear too firmly 
in the minds of the Muslims.  The response by the FLN/ALN speaks to the concern they 
had regarding the adjusted French strategy.  Quite possibly, if France had not lost its 
political will, the Special Administrative Section program along with its non-
conventional force would have succeeded in establishing security and governance to 
remote areas thereby affording more popular support for the French. 
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IV. CASE STUDY: U.K. OMAN  
That this House is greatly encouraged by the successful conclusion to the 
ten-year war in Oman, congratulates the Sultan’s troops on achieving one 
of the very few victories over Communist-inspired rebels since the Second 
World War, records with pride the contribution made by hundreds of 
present and former members of the British armed forces, and pays special 
tribute to the work of the Special Air Service. 
—A Motion in the British House of Commons December 17, 1975 
A. BACKGROUND 
In 1964, the Dhofar Rebellion began as a nationalist movement by the Dhofar 
Liberation Front (DLF) led by Mussalim bin Nufl.172  The Dhofar Rebellion was 
primarily based on social grievances, against the Sutltan of Oman, Said bin Tamur.173   
The Sultan led Oman as a harsh, feudal ruler and created a country that has been 
described as a “medieval state.”174  The Sultan’s oppressive rule over Oman was 
highlighted by very poor living conditions of the population and his excessive force in 
dealing with them.  In many ways, the Dhofar Rebellion was a natural uprising that was 
needed to improve the lives of the Omani people; however, it became an international 
concern once it was hijacked by communist-supported guerrillas.  
In January of 1968, Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced the withdrawal of 
all British forces from the Arabian Gulf by 1971.  This move was a bi-product of both the 
Sterling Crisis of November, 1967 and the inability of Britain to maintain its influence as 
a world power.175  As the British started leaving the region, traditional powers like 
Oman, which depended heavily on British influence, became vulnerable.  The new 
environment, without a superpower in the region, allowed Arab nationalists and Marxist 
radicals to create opposition groups throughout the gulf region.176   
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The first major uprising was in South Yemen, where the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (PDRY) took power with support from both the Soviet Union and 
China.177  Both communist countries saw the opportunity to sweep through the region 
and replace the regional dynasties with communist governments.178  Oman was the next 
battleground for the communist movement in the region, and the nationalist rebellion in 
Dhofar was exploited for this purpose.  The legitimate grievances of the nationalist 
movement were hijacked in 1968 by the radical Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Oman and Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG).179  Similar to other communist insurgents 
groups, the PFLOAG took these legitimate issues and used them to pursue a Marxist state 
in Oman. 
The Dhofar region of Oman is highly isolated from the rest of the country.  The 
region is bordered by the Arabian Peninsula to the south and east, while hundreds of 
miles of desert separate it from the rest of Oman.  To the West of Dhofar is very rough 
terrain which leads to South Yemen.  The population in Dhofar was estimated at less than 
100,000 people and the majority of the population lived along the coastal region.180    
The largest city in Dhofar was the coastal city of Salalah depicted in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6.   Map of Dhofar Rebellion (From Peterson, 1977)181 
Until the 1930s, when Sultan Said bin Tamur extended his authority to the Dhofar 
region, the area had been considered separate from Oman and fell under no ruling 
authority.182  The Sultan, however, not only extended his authority in Dhofar, he also 
made the Dhofar town of Salalah his permanent residence.  In fact, the Sultan never 
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returned to Muscat after 1958.183  Unfortunately, the close proximity of the Sultan was 
not a reward for the people of Dhofar; they were treated as subjects instead of citizens.  
The Sultan levied many restrictions on the Dhofaris beyond those in the rest of Oman.184  
These restrictions and the poor general treatment of the population led to a large number 
of grievances against the Sultan.    
Even prior to the communist hijacking of the DLF, the Sultan’s armed forces were 
completely inadequate to deal with an organized insurgency.185  The Sultan’s Armed 
Forces (SAF) consisted of only 2,000 armed men organized into two infantry battalions 
and a small border patrol assigned to the border with Abu Dhabi.186  Furthermore, these 
forces were not even used in Dhofar because the Sultan had “decreed that security in 
Dhofar would be provided solely by the Dhofar Force, a company-sized private 
bodyguard led by a Pakistani lieutenant-colonel.”187  Another inadequacy of the SAF was 
the limited education of most of the Sultan’s military.188  This was a significant problem 
because the Sultan had few capable Omani military leaders to train, educate, and lead the 
SAF.   
The Sultan understood that the SAF was not prepared to defeat the PFLOAG and, 
thus, turned to Britain to bolster their military support and help defeat the growing 
insurgency.  While Britain was looking to move out of the area, Oman’s only other 
external diplomatic connections were with Pakistan and the United States.  The United 
States was already heavily involved in the Pacific and was in no position to assist.  
Pakistan was able to provide minimal support; however, they, too, were in no position to 
be the primary source of help to the Sultan.  The Sultan’s long-standing relationship to 
Great Britain, which dated back to 1646, was his primary target for garnering 
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international support.189  The Sultan had already turned to Britain to quell multiple 
security and insurgency issues within Oman in the previous 15 years, and Britain was 
already operating airbases out of Masirah and Salalah.190   
The timing of the Dhofar Rebellion was a precarious time for Britain.  The British 
had just lost a large amount of their financial and military resources in WWII, and, 
politically, they were worried about possible fallout from deploying troops into a former 
sphere of colonial influence.191  Fortunately for the Sultan, Britain still believed they 
needed to protect the Suez and agreed to help the Sultan in a very limited, and preferably 
unreported, role.192 
Initial support to the Sultan was limited to seconded and contracted officers to 
lead the SAF.193  These officers filled the needed gap in the SAF and provided leadership 
and training to the SAF troops.  While some seconded British senior officers were on the 
Sultan’s staff, the Sultan remained in charge of the military and maintained authority over 
how military action would be taken.194  Ten seconded Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots 
made up the Sultan of Oman’s Air Force (SOAF), which was a rag tag operation flown 
out of RAF Salalah.  The initial campaign against the DLF was one of extermination.  It 
not only managed to gain little ground; it actually made the situation worse.   
B. INSURGENT FORCE–INDIRECT STRATEGY 
The leader of the Dhofar Liberation Front was Mussalim bin Nufl.  Nufl was a 
strong nationalist proponent who was a prominent figure in Dhofar.  Around 1960, Nufl 
left Oman to find support for his movement in Saudi Arabia.  While in Saudi Arabia, 
Nufl managed to join forces with the remaining rebels from the rebellion in northern 
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Oman.195  Later Nufl would be instrumental in merging membership of the Arab 
Nationalists’ Movement, Dhofar Benevolent Society, and the Dhofar Soldier’s 
Organiztion into the Dhofar Liberation Front.196   
The first few years of the rebellion, from 1964–1968, were generally 
unsuccessful.  While the DLF managed to disrupt some of the Sultan’s Dhofar Force in 
Dhofar, the operations designed to gain a presence in the coastal towns continually 
failed.197  Perhaps the most successful operation was the near assassination of Sultan 
Said bin Tamur.198  The communist influence from South Yemen, however, quickly 
changed the landscape of the Dhofar Rebellion. 
In 1968, Communist members of the DLF removed many of the nationalists, 
including Nufl, and replaced them with radicals who had embraced communist ideals.199  
They established an organizational office in Aden, South Yemen, which strengthened 
their ties with the PFLOAG, China, and Iraq.200  During the movement’s second 
congress, they accepted three resolutions.201   
1. To adopt “organized revolutionary violence” 
2. To change the DLF name to Popular Front for the Liberation of the 
Occupied Arabian Gulf  
3. To extend the scope of the revolution from Dhofar to Oman and the 
emirates of the Gulf 
 
With support from new Communist allies, the movement increased its guerrilla 
actions and found quick success throughout the remainder of the 1960s.202  The 
PFLOAG used its strong connections to the new communist South Yemen to attain 
                                                 









weapons, training, advisors, and support from China and Russia.203  By the end of the 
1960s, the PFLOAG had over 2000 armed guerrillas and another 3000 militia 
members.204  The insurgents not only outnumbered the SAF, they were also better trained 
and more experienced fighters.205  This stark advantage led to quick successes in Dhofar.   
By 1970, the PFLOAG had managed to extend its control over all of western 
Dhofar, Thamarit road, and the Jebel Samhan.206  This only left a few Dhofar coastal 
cities, including Salalah, under the Sultanate authority.  However, physical barriers were 
the only reason these cities had not fallen to the PFLOAG.207  Dhofar had been 
successfully cut-off from the remainder of Oman and the PFLOAG controlled the only 
road access into Dhofar.208  The rapid success of the PFLOAG created an uprising across 
Oman, and many of the smaller movements in other parts of Oman began to intensify 
guerrilla attacks on the Sultanate.209  Oman was ripe for a national uprising against the 
Sultanate, and the PFLOAG was quickly building popular support, which was extending 
beyond Dhofar and into the remainder of Oman. 
C. COIN FORCE–INDIRECT STRATEGY 
1. Variable 1: Was the Strong Actor an External or Internal 
Counterinsurgent Force? 
The Sultanate’s closest ally was Great Britain.  As previously mentioned, the 
relationship between the two countries dated back to 1646.210  Initially, the Royal Navy 
acted as a protectorate for the Sultans of Oman in exchange for preferential treatment in  
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commercial trade.211  Later, the British would agree to protect the Sultan and keep an 
operating air base in Salalah in exchange for a strategically important airfield on the 
island of Masirah.212   
Throughout the 1950s, the Sultan of Oman faced external and internal security 
issues, due to the many unsatisfied Arab nationalists within Oman.213  In 1958, a Saudi 
Arabia-supported rebellion of Imam Ghalib bin Ali and 600 of his followers nearly led to 
the defeat of the Sultan.214  However, the British were able to quell the rebellion and 
keep the Sultan in power.  After the rebellion, Britain left seconded officers as part of the 
SAF and maintained the Salalah airfield in Oman. 215 These seconded officers and the 
equipment and supplies were funded by the Sultanate.216  The British were offering “no 
free lunches.”    
As the Dhofar rebellion intensified, British Special Air Service (SAS) troops were 
covertly deployed to Oman to help SAF forces fight the communist-backed PFLOAG.217  
However, the SAS troops, with a minimal British footprint, continued to work “by, with, 
and through” the local forces.  While the SAS developed some specialized units 
(discussed later), they never formed “British only” units.   
The British also operated in a supporting vs. supported role in Oman.  While the 
British and more importantly the SAS, were clearly involved in advising the Sultanate, at 
no time did the British take control of the rebellion or operate outside of the Sultan’s 
wishes.218  The supportive nature of the British forces allowed the Sultanate’s forces to  
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be the primary face of the COIN force.  For all of these reasons, while the British were in 
fact an external power, they operated as an internal force “by, with, and through” the 
Sultan’s forces. 
2. Variable 2: Did the Strong Actor have any COIN Experience? 
By the end of the 1960s, the British had one of the most experienced post-WWII 
counterinsurgency forces in the world.  The British had fought the Yishuv (Jewish) in 
Palestine, the Mau Mau in Kenya, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in Malaya, the 
Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA) rebellion in Cyprus, the first insurgency 
in Oman, and the Sterling Crisis in Aden.219  The COIN operation in Malaya is largely 
considered the model for fighting against an insurgent.  However, shortly after the great 
success in Malaya, the British struggled to repeat the same level of successes in Cyprus 
and Aden.   
The EOKA rebellion provides a great example of experience failing to bring 
success.  At the end of the EOKA rebellion, the British had as many as 40,000 troops 
deployed to fight against a few hundred EOKA insurgents.220  According to Newsinger, 
“the lessons learned in Malaya and Kenya had been unsuccessful against a primarily 
urban guerrilla movement that organized and retained a high level of popular support.”221  
Ultimately, the EOKA would be quelled by international pressure from the Turkish 
government and not the British military.222   
While the British were highly experienced in fighting a COIN conflict, history 
had shown that there were factors and variables they had not learned to overcome.  When 
the British decided to increase support to the Sultan in Oman, there was still a high level 
of uncertainty as to how to defeat the insurgents.  It would be easy to think of Malaya and 
believe the British simply used what they had learned in Malaya in the Dhofar Rebellion.  
                                                 
219  John Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland (New York: 
Palgrave, 2002), 221. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid., 106 
222 Ibid. 
 48 
However, it is more likely the British were worried about a repeat of the EOKA and 
Aden losses, when they chose a heavily constrained and largely covert response in Oman.   
3. Variable 3: How was the Strong Actor Constrained? 
The level of constraint in Oman was notable.  First, the British did not want any 
overtly formed units in Oman.223  They wanted to remain in an advisory role publically 
and had no desire to get involved in a full-scale war in Oman.224  Secondly, Britain was 
struggling financially, and this heavily influenced how active they could become in 
Oman.  The British simply could not fund a large scale COIN effort in Oman.  For this 
reason, the British only deployed a small number of forces and also required the Sultan to 
pay for any costs of this support during the campaign.225  While this freed Britain’s 
financial responsibility, it limited the available resources for weapons and conventional 
tactics of the SAF.  These limited resources may be the single greatest factor in the 
eventual deployment of the British SAS.226 
While the British could constrain themselves, it was much more difficult to 
constrain the Sultan and his strong-armed tactics.  The primary problem was Sultan Said, 
who “refused to sanction any program that showed leniency towards his rebellious 
subjects.”227   According to the Sultan, the only acceptable response against the 
insurgents was repression.228  This restriction led SAF forces to resort to cementing 
wells, burning homes, and limiting commerce in the rebellious areas of the country.229  
Another constraint issue the British had to deal with was the Sultan’s desire to strike 
against Yemen, which harbored many of the PFLOAG’s leadership and supply lines.230  
Because the British did not want to escalate the situation, they convinced the Sultan to 
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use exiled Mahra tribesman (from Yemen) to perform these tasks (never British 
soldiers).231  These operations were marginally successful; however, the key was not to 
escalate the situation in Oman.   
It should be noted that the counterinsurgency only truly began to succeed after 
Sultan Said was replaced by his son Sultan Qaboos, who agreed to constrain the SAF 
from the on-going oppression of the local population.232  Without this level of local 
constraint, the population might have continued to support the insurgent as the best 
available option. 
4. Variable 4: Did the Strong Actor deploy a Force skilled in Irregular 
Warfare? 
The initial British support to Oman was a conventional force.  However, it 
became apparent that a population centric SAS force was ideally suited for the conflict.  
Sultan Said’s stance of repressive tactics, and refusal to agree to a population centric 
strategy, did not allow the British SAS to operate in a special manner.  Without the 
Sultan’s agreement to change tactics, the British would not deploy SAS troops as they 
would not be able to implement their desired strategy.233 
This limiting factor changed in late 1969, as the uprising from the Dhofar 
Rebellion was sweeping across Oman, and PFLOAG operations were intensifying.   The 
British government recognized this pivotal moment and decided to back a covertly 
planned and executed coup to replace Sultan Said with his Royal Military Academy-
trained son Qaboos.234  A few months before the coup, the British sent Lieutenant 
Colonel John Watts (commanding officer of the 22nd SAS) to Oman to prepare a COIN 
plan.235  After the bloodless coup resulting in Qaboos taking power, soldiers of the 22nd 
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SAS implemented the British COIN plan.236  These SAS soldiers formed British Army 
Training Teams (BATT) and were largely only changed in name for political reasons.237 
Watt’s plan was a clear attempt to gain the population’s support, and he 
implemented a “clear and hold” strategy designed to reassure the domestic population 
and gain their cooperation against the insurgents.238  Hughes description explains the 
operation well: 
The key role in civil affairs from 1971 onwards was played by the firqat 
forces, supplemented by the BATT Civil Action Teams (CAT).  CAT 
operations usually began with the SAF establishing a garrison on the jebel 
for a firqat to occupy.   Engineers would drill wells, and build a shop, 
school, clinic and mosque.  Dhofaris would cluster around these ad hoc 
settlements for food, water, medical and veterinary care; at least one of the 
SAS soldiers in BATT team was a trained medic, and BATT also provided 
vets for animal husbandry.  Civilians would in turn provide both 
intelligence and volunteers for the government’s tribal militias.239 
This program provided a sign of the government’s commitment to the welfare of 
the people and denied the PFLOAG access to the population.  “Clear and hold” also 
helped reassure the population that the government wasn’t merely going to use them and 
then leave them without protection or support. 
The BATT had a unique way of dealing with stability.  First, they understood that 
the CAT teams would have to move from village to village, and that they would need the 
support of firqat (BATT trained GW forces) and BATT soldiers.240  However, after the 
initial stages of conflict, the firqat and BATT would move on to the next village, and a 
SAF unit would be brought in for security.241  Next, a militia would be formed within the 
village.  After the tribal area was secure, the SAF would move on as well.242  This system 
took time, but it ensured that there would be no yo-yo effect on the villages between the 
                                                 
236 Hughes, “A ‘Model Campaign’ Reappraised,” 281. 
237 Tony Jeapes, SAS: Operation Oman (London: W. Kimber, 1980), 13. 
238  Hughes, “A ‘Model Campaign’ Reappraised,” 283. 
239 Ibid., 290. 
240 Ladwig III, “Supporting Allies in Counterinsurgency,” 62. 
241 Ibid., 77. 
242 Ladwig III, “Supporting Allies in Counterinsurgency,” 77. 
 51 
insurgent and government forces.  Firqat units were formed with ex-insurgent guerrilla 
soldiers who left the PFLOAG and started working for the government.   These soldiers 
were able to move about Dhofar easily, and they were very capable at gathering 
intelligence and working within the population.  Another critical tactic used by the BATT 
was to set up security lines (manned by regular SAF forces), which kept the guerrillas 
from reaching the main population areas.243  These steps created an incredibly stable 
environment and helped maintain the support of the population. 
Prior to the introduction of the BATTs, public morale was extremely low.  The 
only interaction the public had with the SAF was one of repression.  However, along with 
the deployment of the BATTs, Watts’s new five-point COIN plan included a medical 
campaign, veterinary campaign, intelligence campaign, information campaign, and 
finally the recruitment and training for Dhofar soldiers to fight for the Sultan.244  All of 
these were only possible after Qaboos took power and agreed to finance the civil 
development projects (which raised the cost of the war in Dhofar to 50 percent of Oman’s 
GDP).245  These projects raised the morale of the people and delegitimized the initial 
cause of the rebellion. 
Demonstrating military superiority was not a defined part of Watt’s plan; 
however, the battle of Mirbat proved the strength of the BATT forces and 
psychologically changed the view of the Sultan’s chances of winning in Dhofar.246  On 
19 July, 1972, a force of approximately 300 PFLOAG guerrillas attacked a garrison of 
around 40 soldiers (which included 8 from the BATT).247  The attack was an attempt to 
gain a propaganda victory and push the government out of Mirbat.248  The conditions 
were ideal for the PFLOAG.  Because the weather was so bad, air support was not 
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available to the government forces.249  The government forces (aided by the BATT), 
however, proved highly capable and held off the guerrillas until the weather cleared and 
air support repelled the guerrillas.250  This victory contributed to the increase in the 
number of Dhofar guerrillas who decided to switch sides and become part of the 
firqats.251  The firqat played “an important role in the clear and hold strategy” to gain 
back the Jebel.252   
In Oman, the SAS plan and use of the BATTs provided a way for the government 
to reach the population by securing, improving, and remaining in the villages.  The 
BATTs trained soldiers to minimize civilian casualties, provide for the population, and 
exploit every situation to gather intelligence.253  The BATT plan was centered on gaining 
population support.  These operations went hand-in-hand with Sultan Qaboos’ social 
reform policy.254  The BATTs could have used heavy-handed tactics and still achieved 
tactical success.  However, they would have shown the same oppressive tactics used by 
the previous Sultan and missed the opportunity to show the population that Qaboos cared 
about the people.  
Ultimately, the tie between the BATT operations and the reforms taken by Sultan 
Qaboos provided reassurance to the population, which led to the downfall of the 
PFLOAG.  While the British lack of available resources and reluctance to be seen in 
Oman may have seemed to be an Achilles heel, ultimately, both of these situations led to 
the deployment of the SAS and a true “by, with, and through” campaign.  It is clear that 
the SAS led effort in Oman is an excellent example of using the appropriate force. 
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V. CASE STUDY: U.S. PHILIPPINES 
When a man leaves home, he sometimes travels more than mere physical 
distance.  I went far beyond the usual bounds given a military man after I 
discovered just what the people on these battlegrounds needed to guard 
against and what to keep strong. 
—Edward Geary Lansdale, 1971 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Hukbalahap (also known as Huk) movement was formed on 29 March 
1942.255   The term Hukbalahap is an acronym for the Hukbo ng Byan Laban sa Hapon, 
which translates to English as the “Anti-Japanese Army.”256  The movement was largely 
formed by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other socialist 
and peasant parties.257  The Huk’s objective was to wage a guerrilla campaign against the 
Japanese forces occupying the Philippines and to seize power.258  The stated goal of the 
Huk Rebellion was to institute land reforms and improve the lives of the peasant and 
farmer.259   
Civil unrest in Luzon (the main island in the archipelago) was building prior to 
Philippine independence and WWII.  Many of the farmers and peasants were dissatisfied 
with the land owners and the government, which allowed them to take advantage of the 
population.  These land owners used land loan programs to get rich while the farmers 
struggled with large loan payments.  By 1941, almost 80 percent of the farmers in Luzon 
were unable to pay back land and seed loans.260  However, the Japanese invasion during 
WWII made the situation worse.  They pushed the peasant population hard and often  
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used harsh and brutal treatment on the already disillusioned population in Luzon.  This 
harsh treatment led to the Huk movement as well as the idea of “Anti-Japanese Above 
All.”261   
The Huk movement, along with separate American-led guerrilla groups, did an 
excellent job against the Japanese and managed to keep the Imperial Army from securing 
the country and, more importantly, the population.  The Huks continued to grow in 
strength and capability until the American invasion and subsequent Japanese withdrawal 
in 1945.  In fact, the Huk movement had grown to over 100,000 members and supporters, 
including shadow governments of elected officials in the villages.262  When the U.S. 
handed back control of the government to Sergio Osmena on 27 February 1945, the Huks 
were deeply rooted within the population and held more control of Luzon than the 
fledgling new government.263   
Unfortunately, the U.S. and the Philippine government did not realize how 
powerful the Huks had become.  They dismissed them as criminals and thugs.  The Huks, 
however, were now a combat-tested force, with connections and shadow governments in 
most villages in Luzon.  In many villages, the Huks took credit for liberation, and most 
people believed them.264  In the villagers’ eyes, they were the only entity working for the 
good of the population.  Many of the Huk fighters and leaders had been trained by the 
Chinese Red Army and understood how to gain control of villages using communist 
tactics of manipulation and “crimes against the people” to turn the villagers against 
established leaders.265  The vacuum of good leadership and the poor insight of the U.S. 
and fledgling Philippine government allowed the Huks to become a dominant force in 
Luzon.   
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B. INSURGENT FORCE–INDIRECT STRATEGY 
The Huk strategy changed throughout the campaign; however, the main strategic 
aim was to take control of the government and replace the government with a communist 
people’s government.  The Huks originally had a two-phase strategy.  The primary phase 
was a “legal Parliamentary struggle,” and the secondary phase was an “armed 
struggle.”266   To implement the primary method, they formed the Democratic Alliance 
(DA), which would gain support for the 1946 elections (the first under the newly 
democratic Philippine government).  From 1946 to 1949, DA leaders would “attempt to 
win the support of the working and peasant classes.”267  Once they managed to gain this 
support, they could then set up a “national revolutionary bloc of workers, peasants, and 
intellectuals to prevent the capitalist classes from extending their control over the 
nation.”268  The second (armed struggle) stage would begin in 1949 and would capitalize 
on the support of the political base in the primary phase.269  According to Huk 
documents, this would lead to “a mass uprising” and ultimate replacement of the 
democratic government in 1952. 
The many senior leaders in the Huk movement believed that an armed struggle 
was not the best option until the public support was strong enough; however, the election 
of 1946 caused a major shift in Huk strategy and the early start of the second phase.  The 
Democratic Alliance was able to win six seats in congress (one to be filled by Louis 
Taruc, a strong guerrilla leader in the movement); however, newly elected President 
Manual Roxas was adamant about ridding the country of Huks and denied them their 
seats in congress.270  After this event, Louis Taruc and other leaders believed that the 
armed struggle was the only viable strategy.  In May of 1948, the Huk movement’s main 
focus became an “armed struggle.”271   
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Despite the institution of an American-inspired democracy, U.S. financial aid, and 
new leadership, prior to 1950, the rural people of Luzon lived with a corrupt government 
and military system, which magnified the economic, land tenure, and social problems of 
the farmers and peasants.272  The corrupt landowners used loan programs to get rich, 
while the farmers struggled with large loan payments.  To make the situation worse, the 
government forces embedded within the population would also prey on the local 
population for money and food.273  The Huk rebellion had grown into a communist 
insurgency, and they continued to use land reform and the inadequacies of the 
government to bolster local support with the peasants and farmers.   
The Huk structure had three distinct categories.  First, were the party leaders and 
elites.  These members were often very educated theoreticians who believed strongly in 
the communist ideals.274  They were mainly in Manila and spent very little time and 
energy in the barrios of central Luzon.  These members spent most of their efforts within 
the labor unions and within the Democratic Alliance effort.275  This class of individuals 
included the party’s general secretaries from 1945 to 1948: Pedro Castro, Jorge Frianeza, 
and Geruncio Lacuesta.276   
The second category of Huks consisted of middle-level members.  These 
members encompassed all the areas of the Huk operations and included guerrilla, labor, 
and peasant leaders.  Prior to the communist Huk movement, most of these individuals 
were already influential figures within their areas of operation.277  For this reason, they 
were more worried about the fight against the government than the communist ideals.  
While the communist ideals were not primary, the long-range goals of replacing the 
government were widely understood, and the long-term commitment was shared 
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throughout this class of Huk.278  Many of the most notable Huk figures can be identified 
in this category; including Luis Taruc, Silvestre Liwanag, and Juan Feleo.   
The final category of Huks held the rank and file members.  These were primarily 
the peasants, laborers, and guerrilla fighters.  Most of these members did not completely 
understand the communist ideals, and likely did not join the Huks for this reason.279  
Most of them saw the Huk rebellion as a way to improve their living conditions and fight 
against a repressive government.  These members were often swayed by the mid-level 
members to join the organization and, once they were indoctrinated, saw the rebellion as 
a fight for rights and a better life.280  Despite the fact that many of these members took 
arms and fought against the government, many were not hardcore Communist 
members.281  They were merely joining the cause to make a better situation for 
themselves. 
The center of operations for the Huks was in Central Luzon.  While the party elite 
and political arm of the organization was firmly rooted in the capital city of Manila, the 
majority of the fighting was left to the guerrillas in the rural villages of Luzon.  These 
Huk guerrillas were organized into field units or Field Commands (FCs) and included as 
many as 700 armed fighters.282  The FCs would disperse small groups in and out of the 
peasant communities and villages in order to manipulate the population into supporting 
the cause.283  The main area of operation for the Huks was the four central provinces of 
Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, and Bulacan.284   Huk FCs also maintained safe havens 
in Mount Arayat (where the provinces intersected) and the Candaba swamp lands 
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depicted in Figure 7.285  The Huks fought as a resistance force and never tried to take or 
hold territory.  They resorted to ambushes, raids on government facilities, cut roads, and 
confiscated funds to sustain their operations and disrupt government agencies and forces.  
Huks were also very difficult to separate from the local population.  A Huk FC member 
could easily blend into the peasant population and often had close family ties to many of 
the barrios they operated in and around.286  
 
Figure 7.   Map of Central Luzon (From Greenberg, 1987)287 
C. COIN FORCE–INDIRECT STRATEGY 
First, act as an ambassador of good will from the government to the 
people; second, kill or capture Huk 
—Ramon Magsaysay 
1. Variable 1: Was the Strong Actor an External or Internal 
Counterinsurgent Force? 
Prior to 1950, the Philippine government and military was rampant with 
inadequate skill sets at all levels.  After the Japanese withdrew from the Philippines, 
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many of the leaders of the country, including the police and military, were entirely 
inadequate.288  They were generally corrupt and lacked discipline and a sense of 
obligation to their government.289  Intelligence was considered “sadly lacking,” leaders 
offered no direction, and there was no overall campaign strategy against the Huks.290  
The Philippine government was in no position to fight off the Huk insurgents without 
external help, so they requested help from the United States. 
While the United States was an outside power in the independent country of the 
Philippines, they were largely considered a trusted ally and power broker within the 
government.  The United States recognized Philippine independence with the Treaty of 
Manilla, July 4, 1946; however, they kept very close diplomatic and military ties with 
new government.  In fact, the Philippine government was created in the image of the U.S. 
system and was economically backed by American funding.  The Philippines were also 
heavily influenced by American capitalism.  Many American businesses were still 
operating in the Philippines, and they had a very high stake in the continued success of a 
democratic Philippines.  It was common to see many Americans in Manila and in the 
larger villages and cities.   
There are two main reasons Lansdale and his team were not treated as an external 
or outside force.  First and foremost, they provided a very small footprint of advisors.  
This small footprint meant that most of the heavy lifting had to be done by host-nation 
forces.  Very rarely were American soldiers seen during operations.  Second, Lansdale 
and his team always worked with and for Magsaysay and the Philippine government.  
Publically, there was little to no discussion about the U.S. fighting against the Huks.  
Furthermore, Lansdale never took control of the operation.  He maintained his advisory 
status, and, while he orchestrated a good number of concepts and ideas, he never forced 
them on Magsaysay or the Philippine government.  While it is very easy for an advisor to  
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want to take control of a situation, Lansdale ensured his team was never seen as an 
external or outside force taking advantage of the government or the people of the 
Philippines.   
2. Variable 2: Did the Strong Actor have any COIN Experience? 
At this point in history, the United States was a dominant conventional military.   
However, the United States was not only uninterested in COIN conflicts, they largely 
believed they could ignore them.  Unfortunately, even after numerous COIN campaigns, 
the U.S. military still believed they could use overwhelming military power to defeat any 
type of enemy.  The U.S. involvement in the Huk rebellion takes place at the tail end of a 
very costly U.S.-backed Greek Civil War and at the beginning of the Korean War.  Both 
of these battles were part of the American communist containment strategy and showed 
the United States was willing to pay a high price to stop the spread of communism.  
Unfortunately, the large amount of money and American lives required to attain victory 
also showed how poorly the U.S. was prepared to fight against unconventional forces.  
The Huk rebellion is the only example of indirect/indirect conflict for the U.S. during this 
time and the American success is largely due to other interests instead of choosing the 
“best” strategy.  It would be unfair to claim the U.S. had no competence in 
unconventional warfare; however, it would also be unfounded to claim their previous 
experiences had provided them the knowledge and competence to ensure victory over the 
Huks.   
3. Variable 3: How was the Strong Actor Constrained? 
The political restrictions for the U.S. in the Philippines were high.  Politically, the 
U.S. had no desire to get heavily involved in the Philippines.291  Current U.S. policy was 
more focused on fighting the urban Soviet-sponsored communist movements.292  
Another barrier to supporting the Philippine government was the recent U.S. intervention 
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in Greece, where the U.S. found itself knee deep in a Greek civil war.  Most U.S. leaders 
did not want to even consider another such endeavor.293   
Financial limitations were also notable.  In 1950, Ramon Magsaysay, as Chief of 
the Armed Forces Committee, traveled to Washington D.C. to request aid to fight the 
Huks.  Despite real concern for the communist movement, he was only given ten million 
dollars.294  The Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), led by Lt Col Edward 
Lansdale, was told to spend as little as possible, because the limited defense budget was 
needed in Korea.295  However, this limited funding led to an almost non-existent U.S. 
footprint, and the non-conventional role of the U.S. military.    
Prior to Lansdale’s arrival and Magsaysay’s appointment as Chief of the Armed 
Forces, the Philippine government used a completely unrestrained “iron fist” policy 
against the Huks.296  After election, President Roxas vowed to eliminate the Huk 
resistance within sixty days of his inauguration.297  He created a national “open season” 
on Huks.  The Philippine military, police, and civil guards were sent on Huk hunts.  
These hunts were often associated with widespread terror against the people of central 
Luzon.298  Often these corrupt government agencies would use the Huk unt to extort 
food, supplies, and money from the largely poor peasant population.299    Roxas not only 
failed to eliminate the Huk resistance, his iron fist policy actually helped grow the 
rebellion exponentially.  
After the failed iron fist policy of Roxas, Lansdale and Magsaysay realized they 
would have to win the support of the population to succeed.300  They immediately 
stopped the unconstrained operations against the Huks.  They no longer permitted the 
                                                 
293 Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars; an American’s Mission to Southeast Asia , 14. 
294 Greenberg, “The Hukbalahap Insurrection,” 80. 




299 Greenberg, “The Hukbalahap Insurrection,” 159. 
300 Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars; an American’s Mission to Southeast Asia, 386. 
 62 
government forces to prey upon the local population.  Recognizing the heart of the 
problem, Magsaysay started by reforming the military.   He quickly fired corrupt military 
leaders, changed units’ geographical areas to allow a fresh start, and improved the quality 
of the soldiers.301  He also provided villages with a way to communicate complaints 
directly to him and then addressed them immediately.302  One of the more important 
efforts by Magsaysay was to increase the pay of the military and police forces.303  This 
raised the social level of the soldiers and police while at the same time providing them a 
wage that kept them from manipulating the local population for resources.304  
A campaign that started as “open season” on Huks was completely reversed and 
turned into a campaign for the peasants.  Constraint was the primary tool of the 
Magsaysay and Lansdale as the military and police forces worked among the population.  
This combination of resource restraint by the U.S. government as well as local restraint 
by Magsaysay and Lansdale were key variables in the ultimate defeat of the Huk 
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Dec 1941 Taruc and supporters establish base of operations in Mount Arayat/Candaba 
Swamp area  
Mar 1942 Hukbalahap organization established by Taruc and CPP leaders  
Apr-May 
1942  
Bataan and Corregidor fall to the Japanese  
Jan 1945 U.S. invasion of Luzon Island 
May 1947 Taruc returns to mountains and insurrection begins  
Nov 1948 Taruc’s Huk faction adopts the name Hukbong Magapalaya ng Bayan, the 
People’s Liberation Army, (HMB)  
Apr 1949 Huk forces murder former President Quezon’s widow 
Sep 1950 Ramon Magsaysay appointed Secretary of National Defense and begins to 
revitalize Philippine military  
Oct 1950 Successful government raid on Politburo disrupts Huk operations  
Feb 1951 EDCOR project instituted for former Huks -- quickly becomes resounding 
success 
Nov 1951 Magsaysay provides peaceful general elections  
Nov 1953 Magsaysay elected President of Philippines 
May 1954 Luis Taruc surrenders to Ninoy Aquino -- mass surrenders follow 
Table 2.   Chronology of the Huk Rebellion (From Greenberg, 1987)305 
4. Variable 4: Did the Strong Actor Deploy a Force Skilled in Irregular 
Warfare? 
Conditions in the Philippines favored the use of a specially trained force.   First, 
the United States was highly constrained financially and politically and therefore not 
interested in conventional support to the Philippine government.  Second, the Huks were 
a small force that did not mass in any one location, making conventional tactics more 
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likely to cause damage to the civilian population than against the insurgents.  The 
conventional “search and destroy” tactic had already been attempted by the Philippine 
government and had failed to eradicate the Huk insurgents.  These operations have 
largely been considered to have bolstered support for the Huks.  Therefore, Lansdale and 
his advisor team teamed with the Philippine government to create a very unique 
unconventional special force.  Officially, Lansdale was assigned as the G-2 advisor of the 
JUSMAG.306  He was uniquely qualified for the job because of his service in the U.S. 
Office of Strategic Services and the Military Intelligence Service in the Philippines 
during the World War II, as well as his recent assignment as instructor of the intelligence 
and counter-guerrilla operations.307  Lansdale was given extreme flexibility, and he and 
Charles Bohannan (intelligence and unconventional warfare advisor) were responsible for 
advising and influencing the Philippine government.  Under Lansdale’s guidance, 
Magsaysay transformed his military into non-conventional Battalion Combat Teams 
(BCTs) which were ideally suited for counter-guerrilla warfare.308  Lansdale and 
Bohannan also developed and trained special units, including Force X, Ranger Scout 
Teams, and Charlie Company.309  These forces specialized in deep penetration, pseudo 
guerrilla operations, psychological warfare, dirty tricks, and long-range patrol.310 
Lansdale and Magsaysay did not try to overpower the Huk forces.  Instead, they 
used anti-guerrilla training and population-centric tactics to gain the support of the 
population.  The major focus of the special units, and to some extent the BCT, was on the 
use of psychological operations, and they became highly effective.311  Force X, and later 
Charlie Company, was able to infiltrate enemy areas covertly and gain information, 
manipulate, and eliminate Huk leaders.  Their prowess for deception and dirty tricks 
caused constant cohesion problems within the Huk ranks.312  
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Lansdale and Magsaysay spent a great deal of time and energy on psychological 
tactics, which provided a large number of humiliations for the Huk forces.  One example 
can be seen on the island of Panay, where Force X soldiers were able to mimic the local 
guerrillas and establish themselves as a legitimate Huk unit.313  After three months of 
learning about the organization and gathering intelligence, they hosted a high command 
barbeque where they ambushed all of the Huk leaders on the island.314  This operation 
single-handedly destroyed the Huk influence on Panay, which they were never able to re-
attain.315 
Ultimately, the United States was able to help the Philippine government defeat 
the Huk Insurgency.  Lansdale and his small advisory team were able to use an 
impressive psychological and guerrilla campaign, in conjunction with Ramon 
Magsaysay’s reforms, to eliminate the causes of the Hukbalahap guerrillas.  Lansdale and 
his staff of advisors created counter-guerrilla forces to disrupt, discount, and eliminate the 
Huk soldiers.  Lansdale understood the importance of matching the strategic plan of the 
government.  Lansdale’s close relationship with Magsaysay ensured that the special units 
were used in conjunction with the government’s message to the peasants and farmers.  
Magsaysay was also able to show the population that he had eliminated the corruption 
that was rampant in the government, police, and military.  The population now believed 
they had a government that they could trust.  Through the EDCOR program, Magsaysay 
and Lansdale showed the insurgents, peasants, and farmers that land reform was real, and 
that there was an alternative to supporting the Huks.  Lansdale also ensured that the 
Philippine people saw the capabilities of the Philippine government, police force, and 
military, instead of a short-lived U.S. force to defeat the insurgents.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The less aid given and the more the threatened country is compelled to 
rely on its own resources, the more effective the results will be. 
—Sir Robert Thompson 
A. CASE STUDY SUMMARY 
Each of the preceding case studies provides insight into how a strong actor can 
defeat a weaker opponent with a matched indirect strategy.  In each case, the weak actor 
chose an indirect strategy to avoid the strong actor’s strength in direct conflict.   
Similarly, the strong actors matched the weaker actors by implementing their own 
indirect strategy.  These similarities allow for key variables to be identified.  To 
determine which variables offer the greatest implications, each of the research question 
variables from the case study analysis will be compared.  
 
 Internal Experience Constrained Appropriate 
Force 
Outcome 
Algeria No Yes No No Strong 
Lose 
      
Oman Yes Yes Yes Yes Strong 
Win 
Philippines Yes Yes Yes Yes Strong 
Win 
Table 3.   Case Study Analysis 
 
1. Thesis Question 1–Was the Strong Actor Considered an Internal 
Counterinsurgent Force? 
(Algeria–No, Oman–Yes, Philippines–Yes) 
This question was designed to determine if the strong actor was seen as an 
external or internal force within the host nation, and whether this variable was important 
to the final outcome.  If the population sees the strong actor as an external entity, they 
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may not ever fully support them.  Since it is the authors’ opinion that the population is the 
most important variable in COIN, it is important to understand whether the external 
(strong) power executed their COIN strategy as an internal or external force.  
There are at least three ways to view this question.  First, is the strong actor 
working under the host government’s control?  Second, does the strong actor make-up the 
primary fighting force?316  Three, does the local population identify them as part of the 
government or as a separate entity that is manipulating the government?  If the answer to 
any of these questions is yes, then the strong power is acting as an external force.  
However, if the strong actor can work with or under the host government, make-up a 
minority of the fighting force, and convince the local population that any success is due 
primarily to the local government, then they have succeeded in working as an internal 
force. 
The three case studies provide an interesting insight into this concept of internal 
and external force.  At first glance of Table A, the case studies would appear to be 
completely opposite of the expectation.  How could the French be seen as an external 
force in a French Province, while British and American troops are labeled internal forces 
in Oman and the Philippines?  Even though the French had the majority of their force 
deployed from within France, they had no local partner that the local population majority 
could identify.  The Algerian administration was merely an extension of Paris.   In 
contrast, in Oman and the Philippines the external powers were able to work “by, with, 
and through” the local military and police without being seen as an occupying force.  In 
both Oman and the Philippines, the strong worked in cooperation with and largely under 
the governments command and authority.  Lastly, in both cases, the host government was 
responsible for the majority of the fighting force, and the face of the counterinsurgency 
was indeed the host government.   
 
                                                 
316 Thiel et al, “Beyond FM 3-24: Readings for the Counterinsurgency Commander” Small Wars 
Journal  (2010): 1–11,  accessed November 10, 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-
temp/628-thiel.pdf. 
 69 
2. Thesis Question 2–Did the Strong Actor have any COIN Experience? 
(Algeria–Yes, Oman–Yes, Philippines–Yes) 
In each of the case studies, the strong actor had experience in COIN.  While 
initially the expectation was that previous experience would have provided critical 
lessons learned, it remains unclear if this is as important in a COIN environment.  
Certainly, experience can be associated with better performance; however, the COIN 
environment changes so rapidly and varies so much, that it is conceivable that previous 
experience has the potential to provide both positive and negative impact on the outcome 
of a conflict.  The Oman case study shows how the British mistakenly took concepts from 
Malaya and used them with little or no success in Cyprus and Aden.   
Since all three case studies showed strong powers with previous experience, this 
variable cannot be isolated by this study and shown as a primary variable for planners 
and decision makers.  However, it is worth repeating that history has proven that no two 
COIN conflicts are the same; therefore, the successful tactical decisions in one campaign 
may not be exportable to another campaign.  Planners and decision makers must fight the 
urge to use successful COIN cases as exact templates on the basis of success alone. 
3. Thesis Question 3–Was the Strong Actor Constrained? 
(Algeria–No, Oman–Yes, Philippines–Yes) 
Constraint in this context can be referred to two different things.  First, it can 
attempt to measure the amount of constraint the strong actor is under when operating in 
the host country.  This type of constraint would consider variables such as the number of 
troops, financial support, and allowable tactics.  This type of constraint can be generated 
by the strong actor’s own nation, the host nation, or the international community.  The 
second type of constraint considered is the constraint exercised by the host government 
and strong power on the population.  This type of constraint considers how the population 
is affected by operations against the insurgents and determines how the COIN force will 
interact when dealing with the population.  Population based constraint would include 
allowable tactics and amount of force used against the insurgent. 
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Again, the outcome of this analysis proved counter-intuitive to the basic nature of 
war.  The results show that the constrained strong actors actually achieved victory, while 
the unconstrained actor failed.   Typically, the expectation is that when a large force can 
use its overwhelming advantage on the insurgent, they will be able to annihilate them.  
However, it is apparent from all three cases, when one uses overwhelming force it will 
often bolster the insurgent because of the collateral damage done to the population.  In 
both Oman and the Philippines, the government started with hardline tactics against the 
insurgent and the goal was extermination.  However, in both situations, the COIN plan 
changed to reflect the necessary condition of population support and military and police 
forces were constrained from hurting the population.   
In Algeria, the French were given full leeway by the international community to 
maintain its Province in Algeria.  Similarly, France was willing to use as many resources 
as they had to keep the precious resources of Algeria under French rule.  In each of the 
successful COIN operations, the British and Americans were highly constrained by both 
internal politics as well as international politics.  Both powers were unwilling to send 
precious resources and only sent what they considered to be the bare minimum to either 
conflict.  It is counter-intuitive to believe that a constrained military can be more 
effective; however, in the three cases analyzed, this is true.   
4. Thesis Question 4–Did the Strong Actor deploy a Force skilled in 
Irregular Warfare? 
(Algeria–No, Oman–Yes, Philippines–Yes) 
The concept of using appropriate force can be difficult to define.  In this thesis 
question the goal was to determine whether the strong actor deployed the ideal force for 
the COIN environment and whether they performed in an appropriate manner.  It was 
obvious from the Oman and Philippine case studies that a large part of the COIN success 
was due to both the type of troops used and the manner in which they were deployed.  In 
both cases, constraint led to a small force being deployed, and, in both cases, the forces 
responsible for the campaign were SOF.   
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SOF forces were also utilized in Algeria; however, unlike the SOF forces used in 
the Philippines and Oman, they were not used in the same manner.   Algerian SOF was 
used in a supportive role to the more conventional forces running the COIN operation.  In 
contrast, the two successful cases used SOF in a supported role.  It appears that the efforts 
of SOF can be lost, when they are not used in a SOF driven campaign.  Also, as discussed 
earlier SOF was working under the host nation government.  The small footprint and use 
of SOF led to a reliance on working “by, with, and through” the host country forces.  In 
Oman and the Philippines, the SOF forces had viable government and police forces to 
partner with.  In Algeria, the French had no viable local force to work “by, with, and 
through.” 
This study highlights the need for strong actors to constrain themselves, deploy 
the right force, and work internally within the host nation.  It is no coincidence that these 
variables are all closely tied to one another.  Each is highly dependent on the other 
variables.  For this reason, all three variables must be considered as planners and decision 
makers look to apply these concepts to future campaigns.   
B. IMPLICATIONS 
The very nature of irregular warfare lends itself to the fact that almost every 
situation is different, and therefore a one size fits all solution does not exist.  However, 
because insurgencies often share some common characteristics, defense planners from a 
strong power should understand that an indirect approach is the best method to counter a 
weak actor.  Moreover, the findings from this paper’s case study analysis point out three 
additional considerations that are not only inter-related, but are also important factors in 
determining asymmetric conflict resolution:  how the strong actor is constrained; the type 
of force used by the strong actor; and whether the strong actor is an internal or external 
counterinsurgent force.  As such, a strong actor must account for these additional factors 
in order to secure the best chance of victory in an asymmetric conflict. 
1. Constraint is Good 
Ironically, a strong actor that is constrained in its capacity to conduct Irregular 
Warfare turns out to be a critical factor in determining success.  It does not seem to 
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matter the source of constraint (political, economic, or military considerations), but what 
does matter is that the strong actor’s response is limited.  As previously mentioned, in 
both the Oman and Philippine case studies, the strong actor was limited in the resources it 
was either willing and/or had available to apply to the counterinsurgency effort, yet those 
were both extremely successful asymmetric conflict campaigns.  Whereas, the French 
viewed Algeria as such a critical interest to France, they were willing to pull out all the 
stops in an effort to secure victory.  Yet this unconstrained approach ultimately led to 
France’s loss of political will.  
Even though France had a significant interest in Algeria, and exhausted countless 
resources trying to save Algeria, ultimately, Paris’ survival was not on-the-line and thus 
Mack’s interest asymmetry argument holds true for the French loss in Algeria.  However, 
Mack’s argument does not explain the U.S. and U.K. victories in the Philippine and 
Oman, respectively.  In fact, it could be argued that the U.S. and U.K. had even less at 
stake than the French in Algeria, and it was precisely this constrained approach that 
enabled the strong actors to retain their political will and secure victory.  Moreover, a 
constrained approach counters Merom’s principal argument concerning regime type.  
When strong powers use a constrained approach it enables democratic states and their 
societies to agree on what is necessary to win a protracted, violent conflict in a distant 
land.   
Without question, the constrained logic is counter-intuitive.  If asked, defense 
planners would undoubtedly rather have more resources than less to fight a war—both 
conventional and non-conventional.  However, as illustrated in Oman and the Philippines, 
having few resources forces the counterinsurgent to make do with what they have.  More 
importantly, the constraint factor is not unique to the U.K.’s efforts in Oman and the U.S. 
involvement in the Philippines.   
Hy Rothstein does a great job outlining the United States’ inherently constrained 
approaches, which has sometimes prevented application of the excessive American “way 
of war.”  First, the U.S. involvement in El Salvador beginning in the 1980s to quell a 
communist insurgency was significantly constrained primarily because the American 
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government was still haunted by its failure in Vietnam.317  In fact, the United States 
capped its support to just 55 personnel to train the Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF).318  
Limiting the amount of support to El Salvador enabled the politicians in Washington to 
distance its efforts from any comparisons to Vietnam.  Additionally, since it was not a 
high-priority mission for the Defense Department, career-minded servicemen did not 
volunteer to deploy to further their careers.319  Instead, a small cadre of Special Forces 
familiar with the culture, environment and language were able to provide a consistent 
strategy and support to the ESAF.320  Perhaps, more importantly, the small U.S. presence 
and small price tag also kept the U.S. support “below the radar” of the American people 
enabling it to maintain its political will to defeat the protracted (12-year) insurgency. 
Second, the current U.S. involvement in the Southern Philippines to defeat 
Islamic terrorists/insurgents has been naturally constrained militarily and economically 
by the heavy U.S. commitment in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  In addition, since it is a 
sovereign state, the United States would have to get permission to station U.S. forces in 
the Philippines.321  Serving in a trainer and advisor capacity, 160 Special Forces 
personnel deployed to the Southern Philippines in 2002 to work “by, with and through” 
the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP).322  In fact, in the Status of Forces Agreement 
between the United States and the Philippines, U.S. military personnel are not permitted 
to initiate combat operations, and they are only allowed to use deadly force in self-
defense.323  Yet, just like the U.S. effort in El Salvador, the constrained U.S. approach 
has been extremely successful.  The AFP, with U.S. assistance, has been able to reduce  
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the terrorist/insurgent presence in the Southern Philippine Islands, to regain control of the 
population, and improve the capacity of the AFP—evidenced by a 70 percent force 
reduction in the area.324 
2. The Right Force for the Job 
Consistent with being constrained, the strong actor must also use the appropriate 
force in an Irregular Warfare environment.  This too may be somewhat counter-intuitive 
for defense planners of strong power nations, because when you have a superiorly 
equipped and trained military (i.e., the United States), the inclination is to use that force 
in any conflict scenario.  However, as evidenced in all three case studies, the use of 
conventional forces is not the right tool for the job in an Irregular Warfare environment.  
According to Edward Luttwak, military organizations exist on a spectrum between being 
purely attrition based on one end, and purely relational-maneuver on the other end.325  
While no units are purely attrition or purely relational-maneuver, primarily attrition based 
units, such an infantry or armored division, defeat the enemy through the efficient 
application of massive amounts of firepower, winning by wearing down the enemy.326  
An indirect v. indirect conflict environment is exactly the opposite.  The measure of 
effectiveness in a counterinsurgency is not the number of enemy killed.  It does not make 
any sense to adopt an indirect strategy, but then use then use a conventional force that 
was created for attrition warfare.  Instead, the strong actor must use a force specifically 
trained to operate in an Irregular Warfare environment.   
Defeating an insurgency is just as much about the battle for popular support as it 
is about defeating the enemy militarily.  The French were not defeated militarily in 
Algeria, they lost the political war.  The same argument is often made in describing the 
United States’ failed efforts in Vietnam.  The insurgents’ lifeblood (people, guns and 
money) is primarily extracted from the population.  More importantly, if the insurgency 
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is supported by the population (either forcibly or willingly) then the insurgent force will 
be able to blend in with the population making identification extremely difficult.  This is 
exactly what happened in Algeria—as well as other previous strong actor asymmetric 
conflict failures like the U.S. efforts in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.  
Yes, it is true that successful insurgencies often receive external support, which is 
Record’s principal argument.  However, the battle is for support from the local 
population.327  If the insurgency does not have popular support, then any external 
assistance received will be marginalized because the insurgents will be isolated, and thus 
easily identified.  Therefore, any COIN military strategy must be directly tied to the 
political strategy of earning popular support.  The best, and perhaps the only, effective 
way to control a population is to live among it.  This is not about winning the proverbial 
“hearts and minds.”  Instead, this is about working with the indigenous population so that 
they can become self-reliant.  The conventional forces used by France in Algeria were 
not only ill-equipped to combat the guerrilla warfare tactics used by the FLN, but they 
were also not trained to live among and work with the population.328  The exact opposite 
was true in both the Philippine and Oman case studies where highly specialized forces 
were deployed to work with and train the indigenous military structure as well as live 
among the local population.  In fact, the U.K. made it a policy to not send regular combat 
forces to Oman.329  Instead, the U.K. used a limited number of SAS personnel, which not 
only compelled the Omanis to conduct the most of the fighting, but it also made the 
Omanis as independent and resourceful as possible.330 
Once again, the success of limited non-conventional forces in an asymmetric 
conflict is not unique to this paper’s Philippine and Oman case studies.  The U.S. 
involvement in El Salvador and its current involvement in the Southern Philippines are 
both great examples of using a limited number of personnel trained in irregular warfare to 
work by, with and through the host nation to defeat an insurgency.  In El Salvador, U.S. 
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Special Forces not only developed a close working relationship with their ESAF 
counterparts, but also worked at the village level to establish local security and civil 
defense programs, as well as deliver civic action projects that promoted social and 
economic reform.331  The same is true in the Southern Philippines.  Working with the 
AFP, U.S. Special Forces used their language skills and cultural knowledge to develop a 
rapport at the village level, and Special Forces medics provided medical assistance, 
which helped earn the trust of the locals.332  Additionally, through civil engineer 
augmentation, the small U.S. teams established civic action projects that could be 
sustained by the local population.  In both instances, using a small number of Special 
Forces advisors and trainers did not overshadow the efforts of the host nation and it 
obligated the host nation security forces and local population to do the majority of the 
work for itself.  These same results cannot be achieved by using a conventional force 
primarily trained in attrition warfare.   Moreover, by primarily using forces trained in IW 
addresses Merom’s argument; democratic societies do no need to endure high friendly 
casualties or maximize violence against a much weaker enemy because the majority of 
the fighting is accomplished by local forces.   
Finally, not only is it the appropriate force to carry out an indirect strategy 
because of the skills they bring to the fight, but there are also several inherent advantages 
to using forces trained in irregular warfare for an asymmetric conflict.  First, in an 
Irregular Warfare environment, the COIN force cannot commute to the fight from a 
secure location and expect to earn the trust of the populace.333  This not only 
demonstrates commitment by the strong actor and helps hold secure areas, but it also 
compels the indigenous population to work toward self-reliance.  In Algeria, any areas 
secured by French forces were immediately returned to FLN control after the French 
vacated.334  Second, Special Forces typically operate in small numbers and are therefore 
a low cost / low visibility option when compared to deploying a conventional unit.  This 
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helps keeps their mission out of the scrutiny of public spotlight.  Again, consider how 
little one hears today about the U.S. Special Forces effort in the Southern Philippines in 
comparison to the primarily conventional efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Third, because 
using a small force, with relative limited cost, relative limited attention, and the local 
population doing most of the work, helps the strong actor retain its political will 
throughout the protracted nature of defeating an insurgency. 
3. Viable Indigenous Governance  
The previous section identified the need to synchronize the strong actor’s military 
and political strategy in a COIN environment.  Part of that equation is using forces 
trained in IW at the local level to not only help root out the insurgents and defend the 
“village,” but to also help tie local level governance to the state.  The other piece of that 
equation is the COIN force must have a viable government to work by, with and through 
in order to be successful.  A viable state government in the eyes of the indigenous 
population is directly related to whether or not the strong power COIN force is an 
external or internal actor.  If the strong actor is conducting the majority of fighting then it 
will be viewed as an external or even occupying force; and the state will likely never earn 
popular support.  Additionally, the presence of a large external force creates opportunities 
for the insurgency to exploit because it demonstrates the weakness of the host nation.  
Simply stated, it makes it easy for the insurgent to blame its grievances on the state 
and/or its strong actor ally. 
Fundamentally, a state exists to deliver political goods such as security, education, 
healthcare, commerce, and infrastructure to its citizenry.335  However, a state also derives 
its power, and therefore its capacity to deliver political goods, from its ability to control 
popular behavior.336  Thus, the relationship between a state and its populace is dependent 
upon each other.  On the one hand, a society depends on the state to deliver quality 
political goods.  On the other hand, the state must be able to deliver those political goods 
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or it risks losing its power and influence over society.  Therefore, in order for a state to 
achieve power and stability, it must establish control over popular behavior.  Joel Migdal 
defines state social control as “[t]he successful subordination of people’s own 
inclinations of social behavior or behavior sought by other social organizations in favor 
of the behavior prescribed by state rules.”337  In essence, people have ceded their power, 
or their right to make the rules, to the state, with an expected return in the form of 
political goods.  If a weak state fails to deliver quality political goods, or they are 
delivered by an external force/actor, this will eventually lead to a loss of social control 
and state instability.338  The indigenous state must be able to provide these political 
goods and services on its own; otherwise, the external force will have little chance of 
being successful as the state will be mired in instability.  They key is to assist the host 
nation in critical areas, and not make them dependent on external support.339   
Although France viewed itself as the legitimate government in Algeria, like any 
colonial power, it clearly did not have popular support from the majority Muslim 
population.340  Moreover, beyond the European quarter of Algiers, the French 
administration in Algeria never extended viable governance throughout the country. Even 
if Metropolitan France had deployed the right force to quell the FLN, it likely would not 
have been able to control the population because of the weak nature of the French 
administration in Algeria.  By contrast, both the U.S. and U.K. were able to successfully 
work through the Philippine and Oman governments, respectively.  This same argument 
can be made for the U.S. efforts in El Salvador and the Southern Philippines.  In these 
successful COIN campaigns the strong actor’s allies needed external help defeating an 
insurgency.  However, because the host nation was ultimately able to spread good 
governance, and because the host nation security forces did most of the fighting, the 
strong actor was not viewed as an external occupying force.  A viable host nation 
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government must be able to coordinate both its civil and military efforts; otherwise, no 
amount of external support will be enough to achieve victory.341  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
When you can whip any man in the world, you never know peace. 
—Mohammed Ali 
The purpose of this paper was to identify important variables beyond adopting a 
matched indirect strategy that could help strong powers defeat a weaker adversary.  It 
would logically follow that absence of these variables would be a litmus test for strong 
actors to determine whether or not it should get involved in an active asymmetric 
conflict.   To be clear, the complexities of Irregular Warfare are so great that there is no 
magic bullet that will work in every scenario.  Indeed, victory does have a thousand 
fathers.  However, this paper has identified three key considerations that a strong actor 
should account for if it is going to be successful in defeating a materially weaker 
adversary in an indirect v. indirect conflict.   
What does this mean for strong actor defense planners?  First, counter-intuitively 
the strong actor must resist the urge to use its full arsenal against a weaker opponent.  The 
evidence is overwhelming that being constrained compels the indigenous force to do the 
brunt of the fighting.  As illustrated in the Oman case study, when additional forces were 
needed, the U.K. declined sending more troops.342  In response, the Omanis not only 
tripled the size of its armed forces, but even when this proved insufficient, Oman reached 
out to regional allies for additional troops.343  “To paraphrase Milton and Rose Friedman, 
when you spend your own money on yourself, you are motivated to get what you need 
most at the best price.  When you spend other people’s money on yourself, you get what 
you want most but price does not matter.”344 
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Second, the strong actor should primarily use forces that are trained in Irregular 
Warfare.  This almost seems too elementary, but the inclination of a strong power is to 
want to use its large, well-trained and well-equipped army that can quickly defeat the 
enemy.  This does not mean that conventional forces are never required, or that 
insurgencies can never be quickly defeated.  However, if the security situation is so bad 
that conventional forces are required that cannot be provided by the host nation or 
regional allies, then the Special Forces should at least be the supported command.  The 
key for the strong actor is to tailor the support based on the expertise lacked by the host 
nation.345  Because the enemy is often not easily identified in an asymmetric conflict 
environment, the strong actor must attempt to isolate insurgents by winning the battle for 
control of the population.  This is best achieved by using personnel that are trained to live 
and work among the indigenous people and help tie the local community to state 
governance.  Moreover, asymmetric conflicts are typically protracted in nature.  By 
providing a small contingent of Special Forces, it reduces the price tag and the visibility 
for the strong actor, which not only decreases the chance it will lose its political will, but 
also increases the chance of victory.      
Third, the strong actor cannot be viewed as an external COIN force; otherwise, it 
has little chance of controlling the population without using repressive force.  While this 
certainly can be accomplished, it will increase the price tag by requiring additional 
resources, and ultimately drain the strong actor’s political will.  Instead, the strong actor 
must have a viable indigenous governance system to work by, with, and through.   The 
host nation must be capable of delivering political goods and services to its populace with 
the assistance of the strong power, as well as coordinate its military and political 
strategies to be deemed as viable.   To this end, the strong actor must consider host 
nation’s governance capacity as part of the Irregular Warfare environment and it must be 
a key consideration before committing to an active asymmetric conflict.  While a viable 
host nation government appears critical to defeating a weaker adversary, this paper does 
not address the issue about what a strong actor should do if a viable host nation 
government does not exist; however, it would be a great area to launch additional 
                                                 
345 Ladwig III, “Supporting Allies in Counterinsurgency,” 80. 
 81 
research.  If a viable indigenous governance capacity does not exist then the strong actor 
should seriously consider not getting involved.  If it does, a slippery slope exists that will 
require increasing strong actor resources and violates the principle that it is the host 
nation’s war to win or lose.346 
Finally, in the social science realm, any theory that can explain a complex 
phenomenon such as asymmetric conflict outcome over 75 percent of the time is 
tremendous.  Yet, the nature of warfare is unique in that the gap between theory and 
reality is filled by the lives of brave young men and women sent to fight its nation’s wars.  
In short, 75 percent is not good enough.  Building upon Arreguín-Toft’s STRATINT 
theory this thesis contends that a strong actor must use constraint, the appropriate force, 
and have a viable indigenous government to work through to increase its probability of 
defeating David.   
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